Tackle youth crime with High Intensity Training Camps
Reform UK · what the evidence says
An independent, source-checked look at Reform UK’s policy “Tackle youth crime with High Intensity Training Camps” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.
Crime, justice & national security — Hurts
minor · moderate confidence
The evidence from multiple reviews suggests that military-style training camps for young offenders do not reduce reoffending and may slightly increase it — though the effect depends heavily on how much rehabilitative support is included. The policy as stated emphasises discipline and values rather than the therapeutic aftercare that drove any past successes.
The evidence
- The policy commits to reopening High Intensity Training Camps for young offenders focused on basic education, teamwork, and values. — reformparty.uk (manifesto) — “Reform UK will tackle youth crime by reopening High Intensity Training Camps for young offenders to teach basic education, teamwork, and values.”
- The Youth Endowment Fund, based on robust reviews, finds that boot camp participants are on average 6% more likely to become involved in future crime. — youthendowmentfund.org.uk (media) — “young people who participate in a boot camp have been 6% more likely to become involved in future violent and non-violent crime, on average.”
- The College of Policing finds boot camps have not had a statistically significant effect on reoffending rates overall. — vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com (media) — “boot camps have not had a statistically significant effect on reoffending rates overall.”
- The Campbell Collaboration meta-analysis found boot camps are neither worse nor better than prison for recidivism. — campbellcollaboration.org (media) — “boot camps are neither worse nor better than prison" in terms of recidivism.”
- The Colchester Military Corrective Training Centre — one of the two UK trials — was an outright failure, with participants more likely to commit violent offences. — independent.co.uk (media) — “Colchester participants were more likely to commit violent offences, and their reoffending cost society an average of £839 more than for other young offenders.”
- Colchester was not cost-effective, losing 89p for every £1 invested, and its use for teenagers ceased in 1998. — youthendowmentfund.org.uk (media) — “estimated loss of 89p for every £1 invested, and its use for teenage offenders ceased in 1998 due to high costs.”
- The Thorn Cross HIT Centre showed lower reconviction rates but its success was attributed to rehabilitative aspects and aftercare, not the military regime itself. — independent.co.uk (media) — “its success was attributed more to the rehabilitative aspects and aftercare, rather than the "tough" military regime itself.”
- The prevailing expert view from meta-analyses is that punitive boot camps are ineffective and can be counterproductive. — youthendowmentfund.org.uk (media) — “The prevailing expert view, supported by meta-analyses and systematic reviews from organisations like the Youth Endowment Fund and the College of Policing, is that these camps, especially those with a strong punitive or …”
- Boot camps tend to focus on behavioural change without addressing underlying causes of offending such as trauma or depression. — liahonaacademy.com (media) — “Boot camps tend to focus on behavioural change without addressing the deeper, underlying causes of offending, such as childhood trauma, anger, or depression.”
- Lack of adequate follow-up or aftercare is a significant issue, and is crucial for successful community reintegration. — youthendowmentfund.org.uk (media) — “a significant issue noted in evaluations is the lack of adequate follow-up or aftercare, which is crucial for successful community reintegration.”
Biggest unknown: Whether the reopened camps would include robust rehabilitative aftercare and therapeutic components, which the evidence suggests are the actual drivers of any positive outcome.
Our reading: The policy commits to reopening High Intensity Training Camps with a focus on education, teamwork, and values — but says nothing about therapeutic aftercare, trauma-informed care, or community reintegration support. The evidence base is notably negative: the YEF's high-confidence finding is a 6% average increase in future offending; the College of Policing finds no statistically significant benefit; and the Campbell Collaboration places boot camps on par with prison. The two UK trials split: Thorn Cross showed short-term gains, but these were driven by its rehabilitative components, not the military-style discipline. Colchester — the more punitive of the two — increased violent offending and lost 89p per £1 invested. The policy as stated more closely resembles the Colchester model (discipline and values) than the Thorn Cross model (rehabilitation and aftercare). Without a committed therapeutic and aftercare mechanism — which the policy does not mention — the balance of evidence points to a marginal worsening of reoffending outcomes. The effect is scored 'minor' rather than 'moderate' because the absolute population covered by any such camps would be small, and because the Thorn Cross evidence does leave open the possibility that a well-designed camp could avoid harm. However, the policy text gives no grounds for confidence that the design would be well-suited to what the evidence actually supports.
Education & opportunity — Hurts
moderate · moderate confidence
The evidence from multiple reviews suggests boot camps for young offenders do not reduce reoffending and may make it worse — so any basic education delivered this way is unlikely to improve young people's long-term opportunities. The main caveat is that the one UK camp with a strong rehabilitative and education focus did show some early promise, but experts attribute that to those elements, not the military-style regime.
The evidence
- The policy commits to reopening High Intensity Training Camps to teach basic education, teamwork, and values to young offenders. — reformparty.uk (manifesto) — “Reform UK will tackle youth crime by reopening High Intensity Training Camps for young offenders to teach basic education, teamwork, and values.”
- The Youth Endowment Fund finds that young people attending boot camps are on average 6% more likely to become involved in future crime. — youthendowmentfund.org.uk (media) — “young people who participate in a boot camp have been 6% more likely to become involved in future violent and non-violent crime, on average.”
- The College of Policing concludes boot camps have not had a statistically significant effect on reoffending rates. — vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com (media) — “boot camps have not had a statistically significant effect on reoffending rates overall.”
- The Colchester Military Corrective Training Centre was an outright failure, with participants more likely to commit violent offences. — independent.co.uk (media) — “Colchester participants were more likely to commit violent offences, and their reoffending cost society an average of £839 more than for other young offenders.”
- Colchester was not cost-effective, with an estimated loss of 89p for every £1 invested. — youthendowmentfund.org.uk (media) — “an estimated loss of 89p for every £1 invested, and its use for teenage offenders ceased in 1998 due to high costs.”
- Where early positive results were seen at Thorn Cross, success was attributed to rehabilitative and educational components rather than the military regime itself. — independent.co.uk (media) — “its success was attributed more to the rehabilitative aspects and aftercare, rather than the "tough" military regime itself.”
- Boot camps tend not to address the underlying causes of offending such as trauma or mental health, limiting educational and developmental impact. — liahonaacademy.com (media) — “Boot camps tend to focus on behavioural change without addressing the deeper, underlying causes of offending, such as childhood trauma, anger, or depression.”
- Sending young people to remote locations limits their access to support for reintegration, undermining any educational gains. — youthendowmentfund.org.uk (media) — “Sending young people to remote locations, away from their families and communities, also limits their access to crucial support for reintegration.”
- The prevailing expert view is that punitive camps are ineffective and can be counterproductive. — youthendowmentfund.org.uk (media) — “The prevailing expert view, supported by meta-analyses and systematic reviews from organisations like the Youth Endowment Fund and the College of Policing, is that these camps, especially those with a strong punitive or …”
- IFS research shows youth club closures led to teenagers performing 4% worse in exams, illustrating that community-based support improves educational outcomes. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “youth club closures during the 2010s led to teenagers being 14% more likely to commit crimes and performing 4% worse in exams at age 16.”
Biggest unknown: Whether the policy would replicate the rehabilitative Thorn Cross model or the punitive Colchester model would change the verdict, but the stated policy text does not specify this.
Our reading: The policy promises basic education within High Intensity Training Camps. On the evidence, the vehicle chosen — a boot camp model — is likely to undermine rather than reinforce educational opportunity for the young people involved. The YEF, the College of Policing, and the Campbell Collaboration all find that boot camps on average do not reduce reoffending and can increase it. For O7, this matters because educational progress and opportunity for young offenders depends on sustained, stable, trauma-informed support. Boot camps, as evidenced by the Colchester failure, isolate young people from communities and families, increase reoffending, and do not address underlying causes of offending like trauma. Even where some basic education is delivered inside the camps, the removal from community networks and the lack of effective aftercare undermines any gains. The one partial UK success (Thorn Cross) is attributed by evaluators to its rehabilitative components — precisely what a military-style regime tends to crowd out. The IFS evidence on youth club closures reinforces the direction of evidence: community-based educational support improves outcomes; custodial isolation worsens them. On balance, the evidence leans clearly toward the boot camp mechanism worsening educational and developmental opportunity for the cohort it targets, even if the policy's stated intent includes basic education. The magnitude is moderate rather than major because the numbers of young people in such camps would be limited, constraining the scale of harm.