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Scrap Net Zero targets and related subsidies

Reform UK · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Reform UK’s policy “Scrap Net Zero targets and related subsidies” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Public finances & the next generation — Hurts

moderate · low confidence

The claimed £30 billion annual saving is disputed by the government department responsible and is not recognised as a genuine cashable saving by independent analysts; in the long run, unmitigated climate damages and lost private investment pose a far larger fiscal risk. The near-term saving figure may be overstated to the point it does not materialise at all.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether scrapping Net Zero targets produces any genuine net public spending reduction depends on how 'net zero expenditure' is defined — a question independent analysts say has not been answered clearly.

Our reading: The central fiscal claim — £30 billion a year in public sector savings — is the only basis on which this policy could improve O12 near-term. But every independent source provided disputes or does not recognise that figure. The OBR framing makes clear that the numbers Reform UK appears to cite represent the fiscal cost of *achieving* Net Zero (primarily lost fuel duty as fossil consumption declines, plus public investment), not a cash saving that materialises from cancelling targets. Since most Net Zero investment is private-sector, scrapping the framework does not straightforwardly release public money at the claimed scale. The LSE and Institute for Government both flag the definitional and analytical gaps in the claim. There is therefore no credible independent evidence of a genuine near-term fiscal saving of the stated magnitude. On the long-run debt path, the picture is clearly negative. The OBR's own estimate of the net economy-wide cost of reaching Net Zero has fallen to £116 billion over 25 years — a modest and declining figure. Against that, unmitigated climate damages are projected at 3.3% of GDP by 2050 and up to 7.4–8% by the 2070s–2100 under high-warming scenarios. These are structural fiscal burdens — higher adaptation, infrastructure, health, and emergency costs — that compound over time. A further £455 billion of private investment in the pipeline could also be deterred, narrowing the future tax base. The direction is therefore 'worsens': the claimed upside rests on a single self-reported projection that no independent source corroborates, while multiple credible downside projections point to material long-run fiscal deterioration. Confidence is low because the long-run damage projections carry genuine uncertainty and the near-term saving, while likely overstated, cannot be precisely quantified from the evidence provided.

Prosperity & living standards — Hurts

moderate · moderate confidence

Scrapping Net Zero targets would likely damage UK prosperity by deterring private investment, raising energy costs, and destroying jobs in fast-growing clean-energy sectors. The claimed £30 billion public-sector saving is disputed by the OBR and others, who say it misrepresents what that figure actually means.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether lost clean-energy investment and higher fossil-fuel energy costs would outweigh any genuine public-spending reduction depends on contested forecasts of technology cost trajectories and private capital responses.

Our reading: The central fiscal claim — £30 billion in annual public-sector savings — is the policy's main positive lever for O13. But institutional sources undermine it: the OBR figure relates to the cost of achieving Net Zero (mainly lost fuel-duty revenue and public investment), not a cash saving that materialises on abandonment. The LSE and Institute for Government both flag definitional incoherence in the claimed savings. On the investment side, the £455 billion private pipeline and the £100 billion annual contribution of the existing Net Zero economy establish a substantial base that this policy would put at risk. The IEA — a pro-market advocacy body, flagged as such — independently warns that the proposed windfall tax on renewables would destroy investor confidence, adding weight from an unlikely direction. On energy costs, the near-term case for cheaper bills rests on removing subsidy levies, but the preponderance of independent analysis (NEF, Friends of the Earth) points to higher bills from gas dependence — and the 2022 energy shock provides a real-world comparator for that risk. The NEF GVA and job-loss projections are from an advocacy source and must be treated as the upper bound of harm, not the central estimate; however, the directional conclusion (investment flight, job losses in a productive sector) is corroborated by CBI Economics and the ECIU cited in E28. Long-term, accumulating climate damages (1.1% to 3.3% to 7.4% of GDP on the OBR-cited trajectory) represent a compounding drag on living standards that the policy accelerates. Near-term, there is genuine uncertainty: some public spending could be reduced, and gas prices may stay lower than feared. But the weight of institutional and independent evidence points to worsened productivity, investment, and living standards over the medium and long run, making the verdict worsens/moderate with long-term salience.

Cost of living — Hurts

moderate · moderate confidence

Scrapping Net Zero subsidies is projected by most independent analysts to raise household energy bills and increase the UK's exposure to volatile gas prices, outweighing any potential savings from reduced green levies. The main uncertainty is how much of current energy bills is driven by renewable subsidies versus gas prices.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether scrapping renewable subsidies would cut or raise household energy bills depends on the relative weight of renewable levies versus gas price exposure — credible analysts disagree on this split.

Our reading: The policy's stated rationale — that scrapping Net Zero targets saves £30 billion per year — is contested at its foundation. The government body responsible does not recognise the figure, and the OBR analysis it appears to draw on relates to the cost of achieving Net Zero (mainly lost tax revenues and public investment), not a cash saving from abandonment. The Institute for Government has noted the policy misrepresents the analyses by ignoring that most investment is private-sector, not public. For the O2 fundamental — can people afford essentials, especially energy — the critical question is what happens to household energy bills. The policy's implicit promise is lower bills from removed green levies. But multiple independent forecasts point the other way: without Contracts for Difference and renewable subsidies, large-scale wind and solar become unviable, leaving more of the electricity price set by gas. NEF projects at least £230 per household added to bills by 2030. Friends of the Earth and others argue gas prices — not renewable subsidies — are already the primary driver of high bills, so removing renewables support would worsen exposure to gas price volatility, as demonstrated after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The counter-argument — that renewable levies are themselves a significant bill driver — has some grounding (Professor Hughes's analysis), but the weight of cited independent evidence points toward higher, not lower, bills. The LSE notes the policy lacks clarity on how savings would be achieved. On balance, the evidence leans toward this policy worsening cost-of-living outcomes for ordinary households through higher energy bills and greater price volatility. The effect would build over time as renewable capacity fails to materialise, placing this in the long-term horizon. Magnitude is moderate given the scale of projected bill increases, though genuine uncertainty about the gas-versus-levy split prevents a 'major' rating.

Good work & fair pay — Hurts

major · moderate confidence

Scrapping Net Zero targets and renewable subsidies would likely destroy tens of thousands of well-paid green jobs and deter hundreds of billions in private investment, making it harder for people to earn a decent living in a fast-growing sector. The main uncertainty is how quickly fossil-fuel or other industries might absorb displaced workers.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether job losses in wind, solar and related industries would be offset by growth in fossil-fuel or other sectors — no cited evidence supports a like-for-like replacement.

Our reading: The policy's central claim — over £30 billion in annual public sector savings — is disputed by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and by independent analysts who clarify it represents the fiscal cost of reaching Net Zero, not a realisable saving from abandoning it. This undermines the core economic justification for the policy. On O4 specifically, the evidence points clearly toward harm. The Net Zero economy already supports 1.1 million FTE jobs paying 11% above the national average wage, and has attracted £23 billion in private investment with £455 billion more in the pipeline. Scrapping renewable subsidies like CfDs would make large-scale projects unviable, directly threatening this employment base. NEF projects 60,000+ direct job losses in wind and solar alone by 2030, with broader GVA losses of £67–92 billion. Longer-term, up to 1.4 million jobs by 2040 could be foregone. The Institute of Economic Affairs — a market-oriented source not predisposed to defending renewables — also warned the specific windfall-tax proposal would destroy investor confidence, reinforcing the investment-deterrence risk from a non-advocacy angle. No cited evidence supports a counterfactual in which fossil-fuel expansion or other sectors replace these jobs at comparable scale or pay. Absent such evidence, the counterfactual gap is large and negative. Confidence is moderate rather than high because the projections are primarily from NEF (an advocacy-adjacent think-tank), though the directional consensus across CBI Economics, ECIU, Transition Economics, Friends of the Earth and the IEA is consistent. The magnitude is assessed as major given the scale of projected job losses and investment deterrence relative to a sector that is already a significant share of the UK labour market.

Clean environment & nature — Hurts

major · moderate confidence

Scrapping Net Zero targets and renewable subsidies would increase UK greenhouse gas emissions, make large-scale renewable projects unviable, and compound climate damage costs over time. The main caveat is that precise damage trajectories are uncertain, but the directional finding is consistent across independent sources.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether any alternative energy policy could partially offset emissions growth, and how quickly climate damages materialise versus projected timescales.

Our reading: The environmental verdict is clear and consistent across independent sources. Scrapping the UK's legally binding net-zero framework and removing subsidy support for renewables directly worsens O6's core indicators: emissions trajectory, long-term climate sustainability, and energy resilience. The legally binding 2050 commitment would be missed. Climate damage costs are projected to rise sharply without action — from 1.1% of GDP today to over 7% by 2100 — and these are modelled projections, not certainties, but the directional finding is robust. Removing renewable subsidies would make large-scale wind and solar projects unviable, locking in fossil fuel dependence and greater exposure to gas price volatility. The claimed £30bn saving is disputed by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and mischaracterised relative to OBR analysis, which counts lost fuel duty and public investment as costs of transition rather than savings that materialise from abandonment. Even the Institute of Economic Affairs (an advocacy source, pro-market) warns the windfall tax on renewables could destroy investor confidence — a cross-ideological signal that the mechanism is harmful on its own terms. Near-term effects include renewable investment collapse and increased fossil fuel reliance; long-term effects include missed climate targets and compounding climate damages. Both horizons point the same way. Confidence is moderate rather than high because the precise quantification of emissions and damage trajectories is uncertain, but the directional verdict is robust.

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