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Impose an Employer Immigration Tax

Reform UK · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Reform UK’s policy “Impose an Employer Immigration Tax” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Public finances & the next generation — Mixed picture

moderate · low confidence

The policy could raise significant new revenue in the short term, but independent evidence suggests that reducing working-age migration tends to worsen the public finances over time, and the revenue estimates vary widely. The net fiscal effect is genuinely uncertain but tilts negative in the long run.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether behavioural responses (employers substituting British workers, reducing headcount, or sectors contracting) would shrink the revenue yield enough to offset the lost fiscal contribution of working-age migrants, which the OBR finds improves the deficit.

Our reading: The policy has two competing fiscal effects that pull in opposite directions, making this a genuinely mixed verdict. On the revenue side, raising NI to 20% for a subset of foreign workers could generate meaningful short-term receipts — the stated range of £11.2bn to £20bn is wide and disputed, and the IFS's general scepticism about Reform's fiscal claims is relevant here. Behavioural responses (employers substituting British workers, reducing headcount, or sectors shrinking) would erode the yield below the headline figure. On the deficit-path side, the OBR's well-established finding is that working-age migrants make a net positive fiscal contribution. A policy designed to reduce their numbers therefore risks removing a net fiscal asset from the UK economy. If the policy succeeds in materially reducing the stock of foreign workers — its stated aim — the long-run loss of their tax contributions and the reduced output in affected sectors could outweigh the NI surcharge revenue, particularly as that revenue itself falls when fewer foreign workers remain to tax. The exemptions for health and care workers and small businesses narrow the base further. Near-term there may be a modest revenue gain; long-term, if migration falls as intended, the OBR evidence points toward a worsened debt path. The magnitude is rated moderate because the fiscal flows are large in principle but the net direction over the long run leans negative on the best independent evidence, though genuine uncertainty remains about the scale of behavioural response.

Prosperity & living standards — Hurts

moderate · moderate confidence

Raising employer National Insurance to 20% for foreign workers would increase labour costs for many businesses and likely reduce productivity and economic dynamism, while the promised wage boost for British workers is not well-supported by independent evidence. Key sectors like agriculture and hospitality face significant disruption.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the hiring substitution effect (British workers replacing foreign ones at higher wages) would actually materialise at scale, or whether firms would simply cut investment, raise prices, or contract output.

Our reading: The policy's central O13 mechanism is that raising the cost of hiring foreign workers will shift demand toward British workers, boosting wages and employment for them, thereby improving aggregate living standards and prosperity. However, the independent evidence does not support this chain firing at scale. First, labour-cost increases of this magnitude (13.8% to 20%) will directly reduce business investment and sector viability. Agriculture and lower-wage service sectors — which cannot easily substitute British workers for foreign ones, as the evidence on farm labour shortages confirms — face a squeeze on margins and output. Oxford Economics modelling of a general NI increase projects meaningful employment loss (55,000 jobs, +0.2pp unemployment), and this policy, though narrower, operates through the same cost-increase mechanism. Second, the claimed wage uplift is not robustly supported. The MAC and LSE both find immigration's effect on UK-born wages is small or negligible in aggregate. The Resolution Foundation explicitly cautions that high-wage economy claims from restricting migration are 'overdone.' A real wage gain for British workers would require successful substitution at scale — but many affected sectors cannot readily make that substitution, meaning the more likely outcome is reduced output or higher consumer prices rather than rising wages. Third, the MAC and OBR evidence that working-age migration is net-positive for productivity and the fiscal position implies that reducing the attractiveness of employing foreign workers will subtract from aggregate economic output and business dynamism over time. The exemptions for health and care workers and small businesses partially limit the damage, but leave large portions of the economy exposed. On balance, the evidence points to a moderate worsening of prosperity and business dynamism, particularly in sectors dependent on migrant labour, with the wage-boost rationale unsupported by independent research.

Cost of living — Mixed picture

moderate · moderate confidence

This tax would raise employer costs for hiring foreign workers, which could push up prices in affected sectors and squeeze disposable incomes, but the policy also aims to boost wages for British workers — though economists are sceptical that restricting migration reliably delivers higher pay. The net effect on ordinary household budgets is genuinely uncertain and depends heavily on how businesses respond.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether businesses pass the higher labour costs onto consumers as price rises, absorb them in profits, or substitute British workers — and whether that substitution actually raises wages — determines whether this policy helps or hurts household budgets.

Our reading: The policy creates a significant additional cost for employers hiring non-exempt foreign workers — a rise from 13.8% to 20% employer NI. For O2, the key question is what happens to household budgets as a result. On the positive side for British workers, the stated aim is to raise wages by reducing competition from cheaper migrant labour. If businesses substitute British workers and wages rise, disposable incomes for those workers improve. Revenue raised could also fund NI cuts for British-worker employers or skills training, potentially reinforcing this effect. However, the evidence tilts against the wage-boost claim being large or reliable. The Resolution Foundation explicitly says the high-wage economy argument from restricting migration is 'overdone.' Established economic research finds migration's impact on native wages is small — a fraction of a penny per hour at lower percentiles. The Migration Advisory Committee finds migration has little overall impact on UK-born employment outcomes. On the cost side, higher employer NI on foreign workers raises business costs in labour-intensive, lower-margin sectors (hospitality, retail, agriculture) that cannot easily substitute British workers at short notice. These sectors tend to pass cost increases to consumers. Reduced labour supply in these sectors could tighten markets and push up food and service prices — directly harming household cost-of-living, especially for lower-income households who spend a larger share of income on food and basic services. The agricultural sector's 'crippling impact' warning is particularly relevant: food price rises hit lower-income households hardest. Labour shortages could also fuel broader inflation. The exemption for health and care workers limits direct NHS cost impacts, but sectors like food production and hospitality are not exempt, creating real cost-of-living pressure channels. Overall: modest potential upside for wages of directly substituted British workers, against a credible and evidence-backed risk of consumer price rises in essential goods and services. The balance tips to 'mixed' rather than 'worsens' because the wage channel has some theoretical basis, but the evidence on magnitude leans toward the cost-push risk being larger.

Good work & fair pay — Mixed picture

moderate · moderate confidence

This tax would raise costs for employers hiring foreign workers, which could push some firms to hire British workers at higher wages — but it risks job losses and deeper insecurity for migrant workers already in precarious positions, and economic evidence suggests the wage boost for British workers may be smaller than claimed.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the substitution effect (employers hiring British workers at higher pay) would materialise at scale, or whether businesses would instead cut jobs, automate, or pass costs onto consumers and workers.

Our reading: The policy has two competing mechanisms for O4. On the positive side, if employers substitute British workers for foreign workers as intended, and if the revenue funds NI cuts for British staff and skills training, some British workers could see improved pay and job prospects. The stated logic — raise the price of foreign labour, make British labour relatively cheaper, boost British wages — is internally coherent. However, the evidence substantially weakens the wage-boost claim. The LSE found no significant negative effect of EU immigration on UK-born workers' pay or jobs. The Resolution Foundation says claims that restricting migration automatically produces a high-wage economy are 'overdone'. The MAC found immigration has little overall impact on UK-born employment outcomes. So the problem the policy is solving may be smaller than claimed. The downside risks are more concrete. Businesses in agriculture, hospitality, and other low-margin, labour-intensive sectors face sharply higher costs (13.8% to 20% NI) with no ready British substitute labour supply — farms already struggle to recruit British workers. Oxford Economics' modelling of a general NI rise suggests employment could fall. These sectors employ many low-paid workers; job losses or business failures would harm the very workers O4 is meant to protect. For foreign workers themselves — even those currently in the UK — the policy risks deepening the precariousness the Resolution Foundation already documents among migrants on tied visas. Critics' concern about a two-tier workforce is grounded: making workers more expensive purely by nationality, regardless of productivity, signals their status is conditional in a way that increases vulnerability. The exemption for health and care workers limits damage to that sector, but the broad exposure across hospitality, agriculture, and retail — combined with weak evidence that wage gains for British workers will follow — makes this a mixed verdict leaning toward uncertain real-world gains and clear sector-level harms.

Equal treatment & democratic rights — Hurts

moderate · moderate confidence

This policy charges employers more for hiring foreign workers, treating people differently in the labour market based on where they come from rather than what they contribute. Critics warn it could entrench a two-tier workforce and potentially erode rights promised to EU citizens with settled status.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether UK courts or equality law would constrain implementation, and how broadly 'foreign worker' is defined in practice.

Our reading: O9 is concerned with equal treatment and anti-discrimination protections — whether people are treated fairly regardless of their background. This policy directly and explicitly treats foreign workers differently from British workers in the labour market, by raising the cost to employers of hiring them. While differential tax treatment by employment category is not unprecedented, a surcharge keyed specifically to national origin creates a structural financial disadvantage for a class of workers defined by where they come from rather than their qualifications or conduct. The 'two-tier workforce' concern is well-grounded: the Resolution Foundation documents existing precarity among migrant workers, and the policy would intensify the financial pressure on employers to avoid hiring them. The potential exclusion of EU settled-status holders from the 'British worker' definition (E33) would compound this by removing protections that were explicitly promised as part of the post-Brexit settlement — a direct erosion of previously-held rights for a large group. The health/care exemption mitigates the impact for one significant group, but the majority of foreign workers outside that carve-out and outside small businesses would face a newly disadvantaged labour market position. The magnitude is moderate rather than major because the exemptions are real, and some narrowing of labour market discrimination could theoretically result if British workers gain relative preferment — but the dominant effect on the equal-treatment indicator is worsening, as it institutionalises national-origin as a basis for differential employer costs and implicitly differential employment prospects.