Combat Fraud and Scams
Liberal Democrat · what the evidence says
An independent, source-checked look at Liberal Democrat’s policy “Combat Fraud and Scams” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.
Cost of living — Helps
moderate · moderate confidence
This policy would help fraud and scam victims get their money back more reliably, protecting household finances. However, mandatory reimbursement rules largely already exist in UK law, so the additional benefit depends on how much further this policy goes beyond the status quo.
The evidence
- The policy would require banks to reimburse victims of automated push payment scams unless they are clearly at fault. — libdems.org.uk (manifesto) — “Requiring banks to reimburse victims of automated push payment scams unless there is clear evidence that they are at fault.”
- The policy would name and shame banks with the worst records on preventing fraud and reimbursing victims. — libdems.org.uk (manifesto) — “Naming and shaming the banks with the worst records on preventing fraud and reimbursing victims.”
- The policy would launch a public awareness campaign to help people spot, avoid and report frauds and scams. — libdems.org.uk (manifesto) — “Launching a high-profile public awareness campaign to help people spot, avoid and report frauds and scams.”
- Mandatory reimbursement for APP scams via Faster Payments and CHAPS is already in force from October 2024. — psr.org.uk (media) — “The Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) introduced new rules effective October 7, 2024, making reimbursement mandatory for victims of APP fraud through Faster Payments (FPS) and CHAPS.”
- APP fraud losses rose 19% to £576.4 million in 2025 despite existing reimbursement rules. — fintechfutures.com (media) — “Authorised Push Payment (APP) fraud losses specifically rose 19% to £576.4 million in 2025, accounting for 32% of all payment fraud losses.”
- Banks reimbursed 61% of APP fraud losses in 2025. — fintechfutures.com (media) — “banks reimbursed £354.3 million to victims of APP fraud, equivalent to 61% of losses.”
- Around 1 in 14 adults were victims of some type of fraud in 2025. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “The ONS indicates around 1 in 14 adults were victims of some type of fraud in 2025.”
- Reimbursement alone is seen by analysts as only part of the solution, with fraud losses continuing to rise despite improved reimbursement rates. — pymnts.com (media) — “without more robust prevention measures from tech and telecom companies, fraudsters will continue to exploit vulnerabilities, leading to a rise in total fraud cases and losses despite improved reimbursement rates.”
- A 'Take Five' public awareness campaign already exists. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “The existing "Take Five" campaign is a well-established initiative that encourages the public to be cautious of scam requests.”
Biggest unknown: How much of this policy is genuinely additional to the PSR mandatory reimbursement rules already in force from October 2024, and whether public awareness campaigns materially reduce fraud losses in practice.
Our reading: The core of this policy — mandatory APP scam reimbursement — directly addresses the financial harm fraud inflicts on households, which is real and growing: around 1 in 14 adults were fraud victims in 2025 and APP losses reached £576 million. Reimbursement restores money to victims who would otherwise bear the full loss, improving disposable income and financial security for those affected. The naming-and-shaming mechanism adds an accountability lever that could improve banks' fraud prevention and reimbursement behaviour over time. However, mandatory APP reimbursement rules already came into force in October 2024 under the PSR, covering the same ground the policy describes. This means much of the stated benefit may already be law, reducing the marginal impact of this policy. The reimbursement rate was 61% of losses in 2025, still leaving significant unrecovered losses. APP fraud losses actually rose 19% in 2025 even after the new rules, suggesting reimbursement does not deter the underlying fraud. Analysts note that without action on tech and telecom platforms where most fraud originates, total fraud will keep rising. A public awareness campaign is a positive step but a 'Take Five' campaign already exists, limiting novelty. On balance, the policy direction is positive for cost-of-living — it protects household finances from fraud losses — but its magnitude is moderate rather than major because the main mechanism is largely already in statute and fraud volumes are still rising.
Crime, justice & national security — Little effect
minor · moderate confidence
The policy's main tool — requiring banks to reimburse APP scam victims — already exists in law, and fraud volumes are still rising. The naming-and-shaming and awareness elements add only marginal pressure on top of what is already in place.
The evidence
- The policy commits to requiring banks to reimburse victims of automated push payment scams unless there is clear evidence the victim is at fault. — libdems.org.uk (manifesto) — “Requiring banks to reimburse victims of automated push payment scams unless there is clear evidence that they are at fault.”
- The policy commits to naming and shaming banks with the worst records on fraud prevention and reimbursement. — libdems.org.uk (manifesto) — “Naming and shaming the banks with the worst records on preventing fraud and reimbursing victims.”
- The policy commits to a public awareness campaign to help people spot, avoid, and report fraud. — libdems.org.uk (manifesto) — “Launching a high-profile public awareness campaign to help people spot, avoid and report frauds and scams.”
- Mandatory APP fraud reimbursement rules are already in force, introduced by the PSR from October 2024. — psr.org.uk (media) — “The Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) introduced new rules effective October 7, 2024, making reimbursement mandatory for victims of APP fraud through Faster Payments (FPS) and CHAPS.”
- The 50/50 liability split already incentivises both sending and receiving banks to invest in fraud prevention. — psr.org.uk (media) — “the cost of reimbursement is split 50/50 between the sending and receiving Payment Service Providers (PSPs), incentivising both to invest in fraud prevention.”
- APP fraud losses rose 19% to £576.4 million in 2025, despite the reimbursement scheme already being in place. — fintechfutures.com (media) — “Authorised Push Payment (APP) fraud losses specifically rose 19% to £576.4 million in 2025, accounting for 32% of all payment fraud losses.”
- There are already approximately 4.4 million incidents of fraud per year in the UK. — ons.gov.uk (government) — “The Office for National Statistics (ONS) estimated 4.4 million incidents of fraud in the year ending December 2025, with around 3.2 million involving a financial loss.”
- A 'Take Five' public awareness campaign already exists. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “The existing "Take Five" campaign is a well-established initiative that encourages the public to be cautious of scam requests.”
- Analysts argue that reimbursement alone addresses fraud only at the final stage and that without upstream tech-platform prevention, fraud cases will keep rising. — tlt.com (media) — “mandatory reimbursement is vital for victims, analysts like UK Finance and The Payments Association stress that it is "only part of the solution" and addresses fraud at the "final stage of the fraud lifecycle."”
- The rise in APP fraud in 2025 despite the reimbursement scheme supports the concern that reimbursement does not reduce fraud incidence. — fintechfutures.com (media) — “The increase in APP fraud losses in 2025, despite the reimbursement scheme, supports this concern.”
Biggest unknown: Whether naming/shaming and awareness campaigns can materially reduce fraud incidence when the evidence suggests fraud originates upstream on tech platforms that banks cannot control.
Our reading: The policy's three commitments must each be assessed for marginal effect over baseline. The headline instrument — mandatory APP reimbursement — was already enacted by the PSR in October 2024, before this policy would take effect. The 50/50 liability split that incentivises bank investment in fraud prevention is likewise already in place. The policy therefore does not create a new protective mechanism; at best it reaffirms existing law and may modestly strengthen enforcement pressure through naming/shaming. On the crime-rate indicator that matters for O5, the evidence is unfavourable: APP fraud losses rose 19% in 2025 and total fraud stands at 4.4 million incidents per year, both figures post-dating the reimbursement rules. This suggests the existing scheme — which the policy largely replicates — has not bent the crime curve downward. Analysts attribute this to the fact that the majority of fraud originates on tech and telecom platforms that banks cannot control, and reimbursement addresses only the final payment stage. The naming/shaming element adds a reputational lever on top of the PSR's existing data-publication regime, but its marginal deterrent effect on actual fraud incidence is unquantifiable from the evidence. The public awareness campaign duplicates the existing Take Five initiative; whether an additional high-profile campaign meaningfully reduces victimisation at population scale is not evidenced here. In aggregate, the policy's core mechanism is already law and is not demonstrably reducing fraud volumes. The additive elements (naming/shaming, awareness) are plausible but unproven at scale. The verdict is therefore negligible for O5 on crime-rate grounds — victim compensation improves (which scores partly on O5 justice indicators), but the fraud incidence signal is flat-to-rising even with the existing framework. A 'minor improves' would require evidence the marginal elements move the crime rate, which the provided evidence does not supply.