Scrap Police and Crime Commissioners and Introduce Police Boards
Liberal Democrat · what the evidence says
An independent, source-checked look at Liberal Democrat’s policy “Scrap Police and Crime Commissioners and Introduce Police Boards” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.
Crime, justice & national security — Genuinely contested
n/a · low confidence
Replacing Police and Crime Commissioners with local Police Boards might improve frontline policing if the claimed savings materialise, but credible analysts warn the boards could be less effective at accountability and the savings may not appear — so the net effect on crime and safety is genuinely unclear.
The evidence
- The policy commits to scrapping PCCs, replacing them with local Police Boards, and investing the savings in frontline policing. — libdems.org.uk (manifesto) — “Scrapping Police and Crime Commissioners and replacing them with local Police Boards made up of councillors and representatives from relevant local groups, while investing the savings in frontline policing”
- Public confidence in local police stands at 67% in year ending March 2025, down from 76% a decade ago. — ons.gov.uk (government) — “Around two-thirds of respondents reported confidence in their local police (67%) in the year ending March 2025, a slight increase from the previous year but lower than 76% a decade ago (year ending March 2015)”
- The proportion feeling local police do a good or excellent job fell from 62% in 2015 to 49% in 2025. — ons.gov.uk (government) — “the proportion of respondents who felt their local police were doing a "good or excellent job" decreased from 62% in March 2015 to 49% in March 2025”
- The government claims abolishing PCCs will save at least £100m over the Parliament and £20m annually, enough to fund around 320 additional officers. — asbhelp.co.uk (media) — “the government claims the abolition of PCCs will save taxpayers at least £100 million over the current Parliament and generate annual savings of £20 million”
- A serving PCC argues significant savings are unlikely because core statutory functions and the staff to perform them will remain. — matthewbarber.co.uk (media) — “significant savings are unlikely to materialise because the core statutory functions and the staff required to perform them will remain”
- Analysts predict Police Boards composed of councillors are likely to be much less visible and under-resourced as a governance mechanism. — police-foundation.org.uk (media) — “Police Boards composed of councillors (often elected on low turnouts and then nominated to the board) are likely to be "much less visible, under-resourced on data and scrutiny tools, and lacking focus or coordination – a…”
- Transition risks include accountability gaps and uncertain continuity of victim services. — tiaa.co.uk (media) — “TIAA Ltd highlighted potential "accountability gaps during transition" and the need for clear frameworks and capacity building in community safety and crime prevention for the new structures”
- The legislation to abolish PCCs had not yet been tabled as of the evidence date, making the transition timeline uncertain. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “the decision to abolish PCCs requires legislation that has not yet been tabled”
Biggest unknown: Whether the projected £20m annual savings actually materialise (disputed by current PCCs who argue core staff costs remain) and whether Police Boards will provide effective enough oversight to maintain or improve policing quality.
Our reading: Public trust in policing has fallen materially over the past decade — confidence down from 76% to 67%, satisfaction with job performance from 62% to 49% — so the status quo is already weak. The policy's O5 effect hinges on two chains: (1) whether savings fund meaningful frontline capacity, and (2) whether the new governance structure maintains or improves police accountability and hence performance. On chain (1), the government projects £20m annually and ~320 extra officers — a real if modest uplift. But a serving PCC argues credibly that core statutory functions and staff remain unchanged regardless of the label, so the bulk of costs persist. The savings claim is genuinely contested, not just politically. On chain (2), advocates say integrated mayoral governance could improve cross-service coordination on crime drivers. But independent analysts warn that councillor-composed boards will likely be less visible, under-resourced, and less focused than a single elected PCC — a governance regression that could weaken the oversight that drives Chief Constable accountability. The APCC warns of an 'accountability vacuum'; transition risks including gaps in victim service continuity add further near-term downside. Neither side of this debate lacks evidentiary grounding: the savings dispute turns on a real factual question about staff cost structures; the governance effectiveness debate is supported by academic research on PCC problems and analyst predictions about board capacity. The required legislation had not even been tabled at the evidence date, adding implementation uncertainty. This is a genuine too-uncertain verdict: both the direction and magnitude of the safety effect cannot be resolved from the available evidence.
Equal treatment & democratic rights — Mixed picture
minor · moderate confidence
This policy removes a directly elected policing overseer and replaces them with a board of councillors, trading one form of democratic accountability for another. Whether that improves or weakens public democratic rights in policing depends on whether broader local council representation outweighs the loss of a dedicated elected mandate.
The evidence
- The policy replaces directly elected PCCs with Police Boards made up of councillors and representatives from relevant local groups. — libdems.org.uk (manifesto) — “replacing them with local Police Boards made up of councillors and representatives from relevant local groups”
- PCCs are directly elected officials established to oversee policing, giving voters a dedicated ballot on policing accountability. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “PCCs are directly elected officials established in 2012 under the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 to oversee policing in their areas”
- Turnout for PCC elections in 2024 was only 23%, and two in five people were unaware of PCCs' existence, suggesting limited democratic engagement with the current model. — tiaa.co.uk (media) — “turnout for PCC elections in 2024 was only 23%, and two in five people were unaware of PCCs' existence”
- Public confidence in local police has fallen from 76% a decade ago to 67% in the year ending March 2025, indicating the existing accountability model has not sustained trust. — ons.gov.uk (government) — “Around two-thirds of respondents reported confidence in their local police (67%) in the year ending March 2025, a slight increase from the previous year but lower than 76% a decade ago”
- Concerns exist about politicisation of policing under a board model involving councillors with party affiliations. — rusi.org (media) — “concerns about politicising policing due to their political affiliations”
- The abolition of PCCs requires legislation that has not yet been tabled, making implementation uncertain. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “the decision to abolish PCCs requires legislation that has not yet been tabled”
Biggest unknown: Whether Police Boards embedded in existing local government will provide genuinely stronger democratic accountability than a directly elected PCC, or instead dilute it into a lower-visibility, lower-mandate structure.
Our reading: O9 covers democratic rights, accountability, and due process. This policy is centrally about the democratic governance structure for policing — who is accountable to whom for how the police are run. On the side of worsening democratic rights: PCCs are directly elected, giving citizens a specific vote on policing accountability. Replacing them with boards of councillors nominated rather than directly elected for this role weakens that direct link. Critics — including the APCC and a sitting PCC — warn of an accountability vacuum and a loss of democratic mandate. Analysts predict these boards will be less visible and less effective at scrutiny. There is also a politicisation risk from councillors' party affiliations. On the side of improving democratic rights: the current PCC model has demonstrably shallow democratic engagement — 23% turnout and widespread public unawareness. Integrating policing oversight into existing elected local government structures, where councillors already have a broader democratic mandate across services, could embed accountability more durably in the local democratic fabric. The fall in public confidence in policing over the past decade (76% to 67%) suggests the existing model has not been effective at maintaining trust. The verdict is mixed because both sides rest on cited evidence: the loss of a direct elected mandate is real (E2, E30, E31), and the weakness of the existing model is also real (E22, E24). The magnitude is minor because: (a) this is a governance restructuring, not a substantive change to legal rights or anti-discrimination protections; (b) the actual democratic effect depends heavily on how the new boards operate in practice; and (c) legislation has not yet been tabled (E36), so delivery is uncertain. No single direction dominates on the evidence provided.