Create New Online Crime Agency
Liberal Democrat · what the evidence says
An independent, source-checked look at Liberal Democrat’s policy “Create New Online Crime Agency” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.
Personal liberty & free speech — Little effect
minor · low confidence
The agency targets activity already illegal — fraud, revenge porn, threats — so it does not extend state coercion over lawful speech or choices. The one liberty-adjacent concern is expanded data-sharing between agencies, but the evidence gives no detail on new surveillance powers over ordinary citizens.
The evidence
- The agency is scoped to 'illegal content and activity online' — fraud, revenge porn, threats and incitement to violence — not lawful speech or behaviour. — libdems.org.uk (manifesto) — “tackle illegal content and activity online, such as personal fraud, revenge porn and threats and incitement to violence on social media”
- A core function is shutting down criminal infrastructure such as fraudulent accounts, websites and phone numbers. — gov.uk (media) — “identify and shut down criminal infrastructure, including fraudulent accounts, websites, and phone numbers, as well as blocking scam texts and removing scam social media accounts”
- The agency's model relies on data-sharing between government, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, banks, mobile networks and tech firms — raising implementation questions about data governance. — cms.law (media) — “it remains an "open question" whether it can effectively address existing legal and operational barriers to efficient and compliant data sharing between agencies and industry”
Biggest unknown: Whether the agency is granted new data-collection or interception powers that extend beyond existing law — nothing in the evidence confirms or rules this out.
Our reading: O10 is concerned with state coercion over lawful speech, bodily autonomy, surveillance and mandates. This policy targets conduct already criminalised — fraud, revenge porn, incitement — so it does not extend prohibitions into new expressive territory. The stated aim is operational efficiency for local policing, not an expansion of the categories of illegal speech. The one plausible liberty-adjacent mechanism is the intelligence-sharing model between agencies, banks and tech firms (E4, E16), which could in principle involve broader data collection on individuals. However, the evidence provides no detail on whether new surveillance or interception powers are granted; it only notes that data-sharing barriers remain an open question. Without evidence that lawful speech, privacy or freedom from state coercion is materially affected, the effect on O10 is at most minor — and even that rests on speculation about implementation detail not grounded in the provided evidence. The direction is therefore negligible on current evidence, with low confidence because the absence of detail about the agency's legal powers is itself informative only up to a point.
Crime, justice & national security — Helps
minor · low confidence
Creating a dedicated Online Crime Agency targets the UK's most prevalent crime — fraud — plus other online harms, and could free up local officers for community policing. But funding is modest relative to the scale of the problem, and key implementation hurdles around data-sharing and technology obsolescence remain unresolved.
The evidence
- The policy proposes a new Online Crime Agency to tackle personal fraud, revenge porn, and threats and incitement to violence online, freeing up local officers for community work. — libdems.org.uk (manifesto) — “Creating a new Online Crime Agency to effectively tackle illegal content and activity online, such as personal fraud, revenge porn and threats and incitement to violence on social media.”
- Fraud is the most prevalent crime in the UK, costing over £14 billion annually, with one in fourteen adults falling victim. — gov.uk (media) — “Fraud is currently the most prevalent crime in the UK, costing the economy over £14 billion annually, with one in fourteen adults and one in four businesses falling victim.”
- The agency is intended to identify and shut down criminal infrastructure including fraudulent accounts, websites, and phone numbers. — gov.uk (media) — “The OCC is intended to identify and shut down criminal infrastructure, including fraudulent accounts, websites, and phone numbers, as well as blocking scam texts and removing scam social media accounts.”
- A core aim is collaboration between government, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, banks, mobile networks, and tech firms. — cms.law (media) — “A core aim of the OCC is to foster collaboration between government, law enforcement (including the National Crime Agency and City of London Police), intelligence agencies, banks, mobile networks, and major tech firms.”
- The strategy focuses on cutting off fraud at source rather than post-incident investigation, which experts view as a central strength. — pinsentmasons.com (media) — “Experts suggest that a central strength of the strategy is its focus on cutting off fraud "at source" rather than primarily relying on post-incident investigation.”
- The NCA has seen a 75% increase in open fraud investigations and a 27% rise in convictions over the last three years. — nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk (government) — “The National Crime Agency (NCA), which will lead the OCC alongside the Home Office, has already seen a 75% increase in open fraud investigations and a 27% rise in convictions over the last three years”
- £31 million is committed to launch the Online Crime Centre as part of a larger £250 million investment over three years. — cms.law (media) — “The government has committed £31 million to launch the Online Crime Centre, which is part of a larger £250 million investment over the next three years for the overall Fraud Strategy.”
- Some analysts consider the £250 million comparatively small against the £14.4 billion annual cost of fraud, raising concerns about funding adequacy. — smf.co.uk (media) — “some analysts express "considerable cause for concern" that the £250 million allocated over three years for the entire fraud strategy is "comparatively small" when weighed against the estimated £14.4 billion annual cost …”
- It remains an open question whether the agency can effectively address existing legal and operational barriers to data sharing. — cms.law (media) — “it remains an "open question" whether it can effectively address existing legal and operational barriers to efficient and compliant data sharing between agencies and industry.”
- The effectiveness of specific responses risks obsolescence given the rapid evolution of technology-enabled fraud. — cms.law (media) — “Given the rapid evolution of technology-enabled fraud, the effectiveness of specific responses implemented by the OCC risks obsolescence before they can be fully established and deliver sustained change.”
Biggest unknown: Whether the agency can overcome legal and operational barriers to data-sharing between agencies and industry, and keep pace with rapidly evolving fraud methods.
Our reading: The policy targets fraud — the UK's most prevalent crime — plus revenge porn and online threats, all of which bear directly on O5 indicators (crime rates, antisocial behaviour, victims). The mechanism is credible: a dedicated agency with a public-private collaborative model, focused on disrupting criminal infrastructure at source rather than relying on post-incident policing. The NCA's recent trajectory (rising investigations and convictions) suggests institutional capacity is building. The secondary benefit — freeing local officers for community policing — adds a modest further O5 gain. However, the magnitude must be tempered. The £250 million three-year envelope is small relative to the £14.4 billion annual fraud cost (roughly £1 of public resource per £58 of social harm). Data-sharing barriers remain unresolved, past voluntary industry action has been slow, and rapid technological change threatens to outpace implementation. These are not fringe concerns — they are flagged by independent analysts. Absent the policy, the status quo involves fragmented policing of online crime and local forces absorbing online fraud caseloads. The agency represents a genuine structural improvement on that baseline, but the evidenced effect is real-but-limited: it is unlikely to move fraud prevalence dramatically at population scale within a parliament given funding constraints and implementation risks. Direction: improves; magnitude: minor; confidence: low given genuine implementation uncertainty.