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Increase HMRC Resources to Tackle Tax Avoidance and Evasion

Liberal Democrat · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Liberal Democrat’s policy “Increase HMRC Resources to Tackle Tax Avoidance and Evasion” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Public finances & the next generation — Helps

moderate · moderate confidence

Giving HMRC more resources to chase unpaid tax has a strong track record of bringing in more money than it costs, which improves the public finances — but the actual revenue gains are genuinely uncertain and may be smaller than politicians claim.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether projected revenue gains of £5–11 billion materialise depends heavily on behavioural responses and the actual scale of evasion, which the OBR flags as subject to high uncertainty and a potential fiscal risk if overestimated.

Our reading: The fiscal logic of this policy is straightforward: if HMRC recovers more tax that is legally owed but unpaid, public revenues rise without raising tax rates, directly improving the debt path and reducing the burden on future generations. The evidence base for a positive direction is reasonably strong. HMRC compliance already generates tens of billions annually, and past investment has demonstrated a return well above its cost. The tax gap remains large in cash terms — nearly £47 billion — meaning there is a plausible pool of recoverable revenue. The mechanism (more resource → more compliance activity → more yield) is supported by historical returns and by specific legislative examples (e.g. online marketplace VAT rules yielding five times the predicted amount). However, magnitude confidence is moderate rather than high for two reasons. First, the OBR explicitly flags that anti-avoidance revenue estimates carry 'high levels of uncertainty' due to behavioural responses, and over-reliance on such projections is itself a fiscal risk. If the yield is overestimated and budgets are set against it, the fiscal position could worsen relative to expectation. Second, the FDA projection of £11.3 billion is from an advocacy source (a union with an interest in HMRC staffing) and must be weighted accordingly — it is indicative, not authoritative. The CIOT's more cautious framing — noting that cash gap is at a record high even as the percentage falls — tempers optimism. On balance, the direction is 'improves': the mechanism is real, evidenced, and the counterfactual (underfunded HMRC leaving more of the gap uncollected) clearly worsens the fiscal position. The magnitude is moderate rather than major because actual near-term gains are uncertain and the OBR's fiscal-risk warning prevents high confidence in the upper-end projections.

Inequality & fair shares — Genuinely contested

n/a · low confidence

Resourcing HMRC to close the tax gap could narrow inequality if enforcement falls mainly on higher-income avoiders, but the evidence shows most evasion is attributed to small businesses and nearly half the tax gap is inadvertent error — so the distributional effect is genuinely unclear. Without evidence on who bears the additional enforcement burden, the direction on inequality cannot be determined.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the additional enforcement activity falls disproportionately on higher-income taxpayers and large-scale avoiders (narrowing the gap) or mainly on small businesses and ordinary taxpayers making errors (with no clear inequality-narrowing effect).

Our reading: For this policy to improve O14, the enforcement uplift must fall disproportionately on those at the top of the income or wealth distribution, thereby compressing the gap. No evidence unit provided establishes this. The two strongest measurable facts cut against a clean 'improves' verdict: 45% of the tax gap is inadvertent error by ordinary taxpayers (E23), and 81% of the evasion component comes from small businesses rather than high-net-worth individuals or large-scale structured avoiders (E18). Enforcement concentrated in these areas has no clear inequality-narrowing effect and could even bear down on lower-wealth sole traders. The policy text commits only to resourcing HMRC to tackle avoidance and evasion broadly — it names no target population, no enforcement priority, and no distributional aim. The revenue projections are large but the OBR flags them as highly uncertain (E16), and the PAC notes HMRC may be underestimating the scale of evasion (E20) while lacking a specific evasion strategy (E28). There is no cited evidence in the provided units that the marginal enforcement activity would be skewed toward high-income groups rather than the small-business and error segments that dominate the gap. The distributional direction is therefore genuinely uncertain — not a lazy hedge, but a real absence of evidence on the deciding parameter.