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Reform the Home Office and simplify visa applications

Green · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Green’s policy “Reform the Home Office and simplify visa applications” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Public finances & the next generation — Hurts

moderate · moderate confidence

The policy removes two significant revenue streams — the visa fee surplus and the Immigration Health Surcharge — with no stated funding replacement, creating a near-term fiscal gap. Longer-term gains from higher migration volumes are plausible but uncertain and depend on assumptions the policy does not control.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether increased migration volumes induced by the policy generate enough additional tax revenue to offset the direct loss of IHS receipts and the visa fee surplus — a figure that depends heavily on the composition of additional migrants and OBR/IFS assumptions that vary widely.

Our reading: The policy has two direct, near-term fiscal costs with no stated funding offset. First, reducing visa fees to cost-price eliminates the surplus the Home Office currently uses to fund broader immigration and border operations. Given that visa income of £3bn already covers only 37% of the £8bn system cost, removing even the cost-recovery premium widens the funding gap further — requiring either additional Exchequer support or cuts to border functions. Second, abolishing the IHS removes approximately £1.7bn per year in dedicated NHS revenue; the IHS was calibrated to match the estimated per-capita cost of NHS services for migrants (£1,036/year), so its removal is not cost-neutral even if migrants use services less on average. Neither loss has a stated replacement funding mechanism in the policy text. The partial offsetting argument rests on the induced fiscal contribution of additional migrants attracted by a simpler, cheaper system. The OBR and IFS do find working-age migrants are generally net fiscal contributors over the long run, and higher volumes could in principle offset the revenue losses. However, this is a projected, contingent effect: it depends on the composition of additional migrants, the magnitude of the volume increase, and contested assumptions about public service cost allocation. Some studies also find non-EEA migrants can show a negative net fiscal balance. Absent any committed funding mechanism or OBR costing of the policy, the near-term direction is a clear worsening of the fiscal position — two unfunded revenue losses totalling roughly £1.7bn-plus per year — with a speculative, long-horizon partial offset. On the dual-horizon test: near term clearly worsens; long term is too uncertain to flip the verdict. Overall verdict: worsens, moderate magnitude.

Prosperity & living standards — Helps

minor · low confidence

Faster, cheaper visa processing and free NHS access for migrants could make the UK more attractive to skilled workers and entrepreneurs, modestly boosting productivity and living standards over time. However, the gains depend heavily on how many additional skilled workers actually arrive and contribute, and fiscal offsets from lost visa fee and health surcharge revenue create near-term drag.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the net increase in skilled migration actually materialises at scale sufficient to move productivity indicators, given that visa simplification is a necessary but not sufficient condition for migration flows.

Our reading: The policy has two main channels into O13. First, simplifying and cheapening visa applications reduces a real barrier to skilled migration. The current system is slow (up to six months for settlement), expensive (a five-year work visa can cost ~£10,000), and charges above cost. Reducing these frictions lowers the cost of hiring internationally, which matters most in sectors with labour shortages. Home Office impact assessments themselves imply that tightening migration costs the economy billions; reversal logically runs the other way. The OBR and IFS both find working-age migrants tend to be net fiscal contributors and support long-run living standards — so a genuine increase in skilled migration inflows would, over a long horizon, improve productivity and economic opportunity. Second, free NHS access for visa-holders removes a cost barrier that may deter skilled workers from choosing the UK. However, both channels depend on behavioural responses that are uncertain in scale: simpler processes do not guarantee large new inflows, and the composition of any additional migrants matters (E25 flags that non-EEA migrants' net fiscal impact is less clear-cut than EEA migrants'). On the cost side, cutting fees to cost-price removes ~£3 billion in annual revenue currently covering 37% of the immigration system's budget — this fiscal gap must be met from elsewhere, creating near-term drag rather than a gain. Similarly, abolishing the Immigration Health Surcharge (£1.7 billion gross in 2023/24) offsets some of the NHS workforce benefit. The near-term effect is therefore mixed-to-negligible as costs crystallise before migration volumes respond. Over the long term, if the policy successfully increases skilled worker inflows, modest improvements in productivity and living standards are plausible but not certain. Magnitude is held to minor given the uncertainty and the offsetting fiscal costs.

Cost of living — Mixed picture

minor · low confidence

Migrants would directly benefit from lower visa fees and free NHS access, but replacing those revenues could mean higher costs elsewhere for ordinary UK households. The net effect on most people's cost of living is uncertain and likely small.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: How the £3bn+ annual loss in visa and IHS revenues would be replaced — whether through higher general taxation, spending cuts, or economic growth — determines whether ordinary households end up better or worse off.

Our reading: This policy has two main channels that touch cost of living for ordinary people. First, it directly reduces the cost burden on migrants: cutting visa fees to cost-price (from a current regime where fees heavily cross-subsidise the wider system) and eliminating the IHS (worth £1,035/year per person) would meaningfully improve disposable income for visa-holding migrants and reduce upfront costs for businesses sponsoring workers. Second, there is a significant fiscal hole: visa fees currently raise £3bn and the IHS raises £1.7bn annually — together over £4.5bn. Moving to cost-price fees would eliminate most of the £3bn surplus, and scrapping the IHS removes the £1.7bn entirely. Unless offset by economic growth or explicit new taxes, this shortfall must be met somehow, with potential knock-on effects on general taxation or public spending that could worsen cost of living for the broader population. On the positive side, OBR and IFS evidence projects that net fiscal migration contributions are generally positive, and faster, cheaper visa processing could ease labour shortages that contribute to service-sector inflation. But these are long-run and contested projections, and the immediate fiscal cost is concrete. The direction is therefore mixed: direct, near-term relief for migrants on visa costs and healthcare, but a material and unaddressed fiscal gap that puts upward pressure on costs for everyone else. The magnitude is minor because the affected migrant population, while significant, is a fraction of the total population, and the macroeconomic feedback loops are diffuse. Confidence is low because the fiscal replacement mechanism is entirely unstated and the net economic effect depends heavily on assumptions about migrant composition and usage.

Healthcare — Mixed picture

moderate · moderate confidence

The policy would give visa-holding migrants free NHS access, removing a financial barrier to care and potentially improving public health, but it would also scrap the Immigration Health Surcharge that currently raises £1.7 billion a year for healthcare. Whether the NHS gains or loses overall depends on whether more migrant workers join the workforce and whether fiscal savings elsewhere offset the lost revenue.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the loss of £1.7 billion annually from the Immigration Health Surcharge would be replaced by other funding, or would result in a net reduction in NHS resources.

Our reading: This policy has two distinct and countervailing effects on healthcare. On the positive side, removing the IHS eliminates a financial deterrent to care for visa-holding migrants. Since migrants already tend to use the NHS less than UK-born residents, this is unlikely to produce a surge in demand but could improve access for those who genuinely need care, supporting earlier intervention. Additionally, simpler and faster visa processing should make the UK more attractive to healthcare workers, potentially easing the NHS's significant vacancy crisis. On the negative side, scrapping the IHS removes £1.7 billion a year from healthcare funding — a material sum against a backdrop of already-strained NHS finances. The IHS is calibrated to approximately match the average cost of NHS services per migrant, so its removal creates a real funding gap unless compensated elsewhere. There is genuine uncertainty about net impact: if migrants truly use NHS services at substantially lower rates than the surcharge implies, the revenue loss may exceed actual service cost; conversely, if easier visa access meaningfully grows the healthcare workforce, indirect gains to NHS capacity could offset the fiscal loss. The verdict is 'mixed' because both the upside (access improvement, workforce gains) and the downside (£1.7bn annual revenue loss, funding gap) are grounded in cited evidence. Confidence is moderate because the fiscal replacement question is unresolved in the policy text.

Equal treatment & democratic rights — Helps

moderate · moderate confidence

This policy would reduce unequal treatment of visa-holding migrants by cutting above-cost fees and giving them the same NHS access as residents. The main caveat is that actual equal treatment depends on how the new departments are set up and run, which the policy does not detail.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether restructuring the Home Office into two departments actually produces fairer, more consistent due process in practice, or merely relabels existing structures without changing how decisions are made.

Our reading: O9 is concerned with equal treatment, due process, and minority protections. This policy directly targets two structural sources of unequal treatment for visa-holding migrants. First, above-cost visa fees — confirmed by the House of Commons Library and visible in the £10,000 cost for a single business visa — mean migrants pay a levy that citizens do not, effectively penalising legal status. Reducing fees to cost-price would remove this differential burden and improve procedural fairness. Second, the Immigration Health Surcharge creates a two-tier system where migrants pay £1,035 per year for NHS access that general taxpayers receive without surcharge. The House of Commons Library and critics including Docs Not Cops identify this as incompatible with equal treatment, given migrants already contribute through general taxation. Removing the IHS would align migrants' formal entitlements with those of residents, a direct O9 improvement. The commitment to 'empathetic' processing also signals a due-process orientation, though the policy gives no committed instrument (no independent oversight body, no statutory appeal rights) for how this would be enforced — this limits confidence that the tone shift translates into structural protection. The departmental restructure (Home Office into Migration and Justice departments) could in principle improve institutional accountability and due process, but the policy text specifies no mechanism, so this earns only 'candidate' status under the soft-verb rule. On balance, the two concrete commitments — cost-price fees and NHS parity — are real, population-scale improvements to equal treatment for a group (visa-holding migrants) that currently faces documented differential treatment. Direction is 'improves' at moderate magnitude, with moderate confidence reflecting genuine uncertainty about delivery and implementation detail.

Immigration & border control — Moves toward more openness

We don’t call this better or worse — that’s your call; we only show which way the policy moves it.

moderate · moderate confidence

This policy moves toward a more open immigration system by making visa applications simpler, faster, and cheaper, and by removing extra NHS charges for visa holders. These changes would likely make the UK more attractive to migrants, raising net migration.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether lower fees and faster processing would increase applications enough to materially raise net migration numbers, or mainly shift the composition of arrivals.

Our reading: The policy moves in the direction of more open immigration through three mechanisms: lower application costs, faster processing, and removal of the Immigration Health Surcharge for visa holders. Current fees are set well above cost-price, so reducing them to cost-price would lower a material financial barrier. Faster processing reduces uncertainty, which evidence suggests increases the UK's attractiveness to prospective migrants. Free NHS access removes a further financial disincentive. Together these changes are likely to raise net migration by increasing both the volume and the ease of legal migration routes, though the size of the effect depends on unresolved questions about demand elasticity.

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