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Restore maintenance grants and scrap tuition fees for higher education

Green · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Green’s policy “Restore maintenance grants and scrap tuition fees for higher education” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Tax & the money you keep — Mixed picture

moderate · moderate confidence

Scrapping tuition fees would boost take-home pay for graduates by eliminating loan repayments, but the gains flow mainly to higher-earning graduates who currently repay in full — lower earners, whose debt is largely written off anyway, see little benefit. The large fiscal cost would likely require tax rises or spending cuts that could offset gains for ordinary households.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: How the £10–11 billion annual cost would be funded — if covered by broad tax rises, the net O11 effect for most households could be neutral or negative.

Our reading: For O11 — money people keep — this policy has two distinct effects that pull in opposite directions across different groups. First, the clear direct gain: eliminating tuition fee repayments (currently 9% of income above the threshold) would raise take-home pay for graduates in repayment. This is a genuine improvement in disposable income for those graduates. Second, the distributional shape of that gain is highly skewed: as IFS analysis confirms, higher-earning graduates who currently repay in full gain the most, while lower earners, whose debt is in practice largely written off under the current system, gain little. The policy therefore improves O11 for higher-earning graduates but provides negligible benefit to lower earners — a regressive distribution within the graduate population. Third, the fiscal cost — estimated by IFS at around £11 billion annually just for fee abolition, plus tens of billions more for debt cancellation — must be funded somehow. The policy text offers no specified funding mechanism. If the shortfall is met by broad tax rises or cuts to benefits/public services that reduce other household incomes, the net O11 effect for ordinary (non-high-earning-graduate) households could be neutral or negative. This counterfactual fiscal drag is real but unquantifiable without a funding commitment. The combination of a genuine but regressive improvement for graduates, and an unresolved fiscal cost likely to land on taxpayers generally, justifies a 'mixed' verdict at moderate magnitude. The time horizon is long-term because debt cancellation is explicitly flagged as a future plan and the full fiscal effect would accumulate over decades.

Public finances & the next generation — Hurts

major · high confidence

Scrapping tuition fees and restoring maintenance grants would add roughly £11 billion or more to annual government borrowing, with graduate debt cancellation potentially costing tens of billions more — and there is no credible funded mechanism to cover these costs. This would substantially worsen the public debt path, passing a large bill to future taxpayers.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether any offsetting revenue or spending cuts would be found to fund the policy, and whether graduate debt cancellation would be phased or immediate — the latter alone could add £60 billion to the national debt by 2050.

Our reading: The policy has three distinct fiscal components: scrapping tuition fees, restoring maintenance grants, and cancelling graduate debt. Each imposes large, credibly estimated costs with no funded offset. The IFS estimates fee abolition alone at £11 billion per year in additional borrowing. Restoring full maintenance grants adds approximately £2.6 billion annually. Debt cancellation, if enacted post-election, could add up to £60 billion to the national debt by 2050. These are cumulative, not alternative, figures — the stated policy envisages all three. The proposed funding mechanism — an international student levy — is specifically assessed by the IFS as unable to 'pay for' the grants in any meaningful sense, and would itself risk reducing international student numbers and university revenues. There is no cited evidence of any other credible funding source. On the O12 criteria, the relevant questions are: is the spending funded or borrowed, and does it finance consumption or productive investment? On the first: the evidence strongly indicates it would be borrowed. On the second: higher education has long-run productivity returns, but the policy as stated includes broad fee abolition and debt cancellation which the IFS characterises as regressive (higher earners benefit most), meaning a significant share of spending is effectively consumption subsidy rather than targeted investment. The absence of any credible offsetting mechanism, the scale of annual borrowing, and the potential for a discrete large debt write-off all point clearly to a major worsening of the public debt path. Confidence is high because multiple independent institutional sources (IFS, OBR) converge on large cost estimates, and no credible countervailing fiscal analysis is present in the evidence.

Inequality & fair shares — Mixed picture

moderate · moderate confidence

Scrapping tuition fees would mainly benefit higher-earning graduates who currently repay loans in full, making that part of the policy regressive; but restoring maintenance grants would help lower-income students access university, which narrows the gap. The two effects pull in opposite directions.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether grant restoration would be large enough and targeted enough to offset the regressive distributional effect of universal fee abolition depends on the final design, funding, and take-up — none of which is settled.

Our reading: The policy has two main distributional components that point in opposite directions on O14. Fee abolition is the larger and more regressive element: the IFS evidence is clear that the current loan system already writes off debt for the lowest earners, meaning universal fee abolition primarily transfers value to higher-earning graduates who would otherwise repay in full. The Irish experience reinforces this — blanket fee removal did not improve access for low socio-economic groups. The CEP evidence further suggests that broad fee changes do not materially alter the socio-economic composition of the student body. This component therefore widens, not narrows, the gap between higher and lower earners in lifetime terms. Maintenance grants pull the other way: IFS evidence links non-repayable grants to meaningful increases in participation among lower-income students. If grants were fully restored at generous levels, they could improve access for those currently deterred by upfront living costs, narrowing the socio-economic participation gap. However, the evidence also suggests that school-age attainment is the dominant driver of inequality in participation, limiting the ceiling of any grant's inequality-reducing effect. On balance the verdict is mixed: the fee abolition component is the larger fiscal item (IFS estimates ~£11bn p.a.) and is regressive by IFS analysis; the maintenance grant component is progressive but its real-world access effect is constrained by pre-university factors. The two genuine and evidenced effects land simultaneously, making 'mixed' the honest verdict rather than a hedge.

Cost of living — Mixed picture

moderate · moderate confidence

Scrapping tuition fees and restoring maintenance grants would reduce student debt burdens and improve disposable income for those in higher education. However, the policy costs around £10–11 billion a year and its benefits skew toward higher-earning graduates, while the fiscal trade-offs could squeeze other public spending or require tax rises affecting ordinary households.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the £10–11bn annual cost would be met by tax rises or spending cuts — and how those trade-offs would fall on lower-income households — determines whether the net effect on cost of living is positive or negative for most people.

Our reading: This policy has two distinct effects on cost of living. For current students, maintenance grants directly reduce the need to borrow for living costs — food, rent, bills — improving disposable income during study. The projected IFS evidence suggests grants meaningfully increase participation. For graduates, eliminating tuition fee debt would remove loan repayments from future take-home pay, a real long-run improvement in disposable income. However, the distributional and fiscal picture substantially complicates this. The IFS projects fee abolition alone costs ~£11bn per year. This scale of additional borrowing — if met by tax rises or cuts to other public services — would fall on the broader population, including those who never attended university and lower-income households who rely heavily on public services. The regressive structure is a key problem: under the current system, lower-earning graduates already have much of their debt written off, so fee abolition delivers little marginal benefit to them while delivering large windfall gains to high-earning graduates who would have repaid in full. The cost-of-living benefit therefore skews toward already-advantaged groups. The maintenance grant component is the most defensible part for O2: it directly improves students' ability to afford essentials. But even here, the funding mechanism — an international student levy — is projected by the IFS and Universities UK to be economically unsound and potentially damaging to university finances and domestic student places. On balance, this is a mixed verdict: genuine cost-of-living improvements for students in higher education (especially via grants), offset by large fiscal costs likely borne broadly, and a regressive incidence of the fee-abolition benefit that disproportionately helps higher-earning graduates rather than lower-income households.

Education & opportunity — Mixed picture

moderate · moderate confidence

Scrapping tuition fees and restoring maintenance grants could improve access to higher education, especially for poorer students — but the evidence suggests the benefits are skewed toward higher earners, the fiscal cost is enormous, and the proposed funding mechanism is widely criticised as counterproductive.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the tens of billions needed could be funded without cutting university teaching budgets or other education spending — if universities lose income and no credible replacement arrives, quality and access could actually worsen.

Our reading: This policy has genuine upsides for access: restoring maintenance grants has good evidence of boosting participation, particularly among lower-income students. Removing the psychological and financial deterrent of tuition fees may also broaden participation at the margin. These are real improvements to the 'access' dimension of O7. However, the evidence cuts against the policy on several dimensions. First, the fiscal cost is enormous — £11 billion annually just for fee abolition, plus £2.6 billion for grants, plus tens of billions more for debt cancellation. This is not a marginal outlay; it could crowd out spending elsewhere in education. Second, and critically, the IFS finds the policy regressive: higher earners would gain most from fee abolition because they are the ones who actually repay loans in full, while low earners see their debt written off anyway under the current system. Third, comparative evidence (Ireland 1996) and CEP research find little aggregate effect on participation or socio-economic gaps from broad fee changes, with pre-university attainment being the dominant driver. Fourth, the proposed funding mechanism — an international student levy — is widely attacked as likely to reduce international enrolment, harm university finances, and potentially reduce domestic student places, undermining the very goal of widening access. The policy therefore presents a 'mixed' picture: targeted maintenance grants have a defensible evidence base for improving access, but universal fee abolition and debt cancellation are fiscally enormous, largely regressive in incidence, and reliant on a contested funding mechanism. The net effect on the attainment gap and opportunity for poorer students is genuinely uncertain and possibly negative if universities' financial positions deteriorate further.