Show the Working

Build new social homes and end Right to Buy

Green · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Green’s policy “Build new social homes and end Right to Buy” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Affordable housing — Helps

major · moderate confidence

Building 150,000 social homes a year and ending Right to Buy would directly tackle the shortage of affordable homes at social rents, which experts say is around 90,000–150,000 a year. The main caveat is whether the building target is actually deliverable given current construction capacity and funding gaps.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the construction industry, local authorities, and public finances can realistically scale up to 150,000 social homes a year from a baseline of under 2,000 council homes built annually.

Our reading: The policy targets two reinforcing causes of England's affordable housing crisis: the chronic loss of social stock through Right to Buy and the failure to build enough genuinely affordable homes. The measurable evidence is stark — social stock has shrunk from 6.5 million to around 2 million dwellings, nearly a million more homes have been sold than replaced, 40% of RTB sales are now private rentals, and 1.3 million households sit on waiting lists. The policy's 150,000-a-year social homes target aligns directly with expert estimates of genuine need (Crisis/NHF put it at 90,000 for social rent; Shelter's commission called for 150,000+), meaning the ambition is calibrated to the real gap. Ending Right to Buy directly halts the haemorrhage — Shelter projects 10,000 homes a year saved — and removes the discount-driven value loss that has cost councils nearly £6.9 billion over a decade. The direction of effect on affordability for low-income households is clearly positive: more homes at social rents reduces waiting times, reduces reliance on the private rented sector, and lowers housing benefit costs. The magnitude is scored major because even partial delivery would materially shift affordability for the lowest-income households, who are the ones on waiting lists and in temporary accommodation. The time horizon is long-term: construction at this scale takes years to ramp up, and the Resolution Foundation notes sustained effort over a decade is needed for a significant shift. Confidence is moderate rather than high because the delivery risk is real — the gap between 1,870 council homes built in 2017/18 and 150,000 a year is enormous, funding requirements dwarf current grant levels, and labour and land constraints are credible. If the build rate falls well short, the improvement is real but smaller in magnitude.

Public finances & the next generation — Mixed picture

moderate · moderate confidence

Building 150,000 social homes a year requires very large upfront public capital — estimates suggest tens of billions per year — but over the long run it could reduce housing benefit spending and temporary-accommodation costs. Whether the books improve or worsen depends on how the programme is funded and whether it delivers at scale.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: The scale of capital grant required per home (estimates range widely) and whether the programme is debt-financed or funded from current spending is unresolved — this is the single biggest determinant of the long-run debt path.

Our reading: This policy has a genuine dual fiscal signal that justifies 'mixed' rather than a single direction. On the cost side, the upfront capital requirement is large: estimates of £15bn/year (E12) or ~£183k per home in grant (E13) imply that 150,000 homes/year could require £25–27bn annually in public capital. If debt-financed, this materially worsens the near-term debt path. On the savings side, the evidence is real but more modest in scale: housing benefit savings of ~£850m/year (E9) and temporary accommodation savings (E5, £2.3bn annually at present) could accumulate over decades. E10 projects £4.5bn in present-value savings over 30 years from 90,000 homes — a fraction of the upfront cost even at half the proposed scale. Ending RTB stops the ongoing depletion of stock (E20) and the associated housing-benefit leakage (E24), providing a smaller but genuine fiscal improvement at low additional cost. The critical O12 question is whether the construction spend constitutes productive investment (raising future housing capacity and reducing structural benefit spending) or unfunded consumption. The evidence points toward investment character — social housing directly substitutes for benefit-subsidised private rent — but the long payback period (30+ years on E10's figures) means near-term debt rises before long-term savings accrue. The OBR's noted financial stress for social housing providers (E17) adds risk to the savings projections. Given the programme's scale and the divergence between near-term cost and long-term savings, 'mixed/moderate' captures the honest verdict: a real long-run fiscal case, but only if the upfront capital is sustainably financed and delivery is achieved — both genuinely uncertain.

Inequality & fair shares — Helps

moderate · moderate confidence

More social homes at below-market rents would directly reduce housing costs for lower-income households, narrowing the gap between the richest and the rest. The main caveat is whether 150,000 homes a year can actually be built — delivery at that scale has never been achieved in modern times.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the construction and funding system can actually deliver 150,000 social homes per year, given labour shortages, planning constraints, and the fact that England currently builds only around 12,000 social homes annually.

Our reading: Social housing at ~50% of market rent is a direct transfer of housing cost relief to lower-income households. Expanding the social rented sector at scale would reduce the share of income lower-income households spend on housing, narrowing a key dimension of the gap between richest and rest — both in income terms (more disposable income) and in wealth terms (less money flowing upward to private landlords). The stock depletion caused by Right to Buy has disproportionately harmed lower-income households: analysts assess that sold homes often ended up in private hands at higher rents, benefiting wealthier landlords rather than the low-income families the policy was meant to serve. Ending RTB would halt this ongoing widening effect on the distribution of housing assets. Absent this policy, the trajectory is clear: unmet social housing need is massive (1.6 million households), the current build rate of ~12,000/year is negligible against that need, and the stock continues to erode. The marginal gain from this policy is therefore genuinely additional. The inequality-narrowing logic is direct and well-supported, but magnitude is conditional on delivery. The jump from ~12,000 to 150,000 social homes per year would represent more than a tenfold increase in a sector already facing labour shortages and planning barriers. If only a fraction is delivered, the effect is proportionally smaller. Confidence is moderate rather than high, and the time horizon is long-term: meaningful inequality effects require sustained delivery over years. The RTB abolition component is more immediately deliverable and has a clear, if smaller, protective effect on the existing stock. On balance, the evidence leans clearly toward improvement on O14 — the mechanism is direct and the beneficiaries are definitionally lower-income — but magnitude depends heavily on delivery.