Manage Growth of Holiday Lets
Conservative · what the evidence says
An independent, source-checked look at Conservative’s policy “Manage Growth of Holiday Lets” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.
Affordable housing — Mixed picture
minor · low confidence
Giving councils powers to limit holiday lets could free up some homes for local people to rent or buy, but the evidence on how much holiday lets actually drive unaffordability is genuinely disputed — and the policy only enables councils to act, it does not guarantee they will.
The evidence
- The policy would give councils powers to manage the uncontrolled growth of holiday lets to prevent 'hollowing out' of communities. — conservatives.com (manifesto) — “ensure councils have the powers needed to manage the uncontrolled growth of holiday lets, which can cause nuisance to local residents and 'hollowing out' of communities”
- Councils would also have powers to remove permitted development rights if necessary. — propertymark.co.uk (media) — “Councils will also have powers to remove permitted development rights if necessary.”
- Over 35,000 homes have become holiday homes or short-term lets since 2019, representing roughly 29 long-term homes lost per day. — generationrent.org (media) — “over 35,000 homes have become holiday homes or short-term lets since 2019, leading to a loss of approximately 29 long-term homes a day”
- Holiday lets represent only 0.6% of total housing stock in England and Wales, with steady rather than rapid growth. — frontier-economics.com (media) — “holiday lets represent a small fraction of the total housing stock (0.6% of 26.9 million homes in England and Wales) and their growth rate has been steady, not rapid (1.9% since 2016 in England, 4.1% since 2021 in Wales)”
- Average annual rents in Great Britain rose 9.1% in the year to March 2024, the fastest rate on record. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “average annual rents increased by 9.1% in Great Britain in the year to March 2024, the fastest rate on record”
- Government and housing advocacy groups argue that high numbers of short-term lets are preventing local people from finding affordable housing. — gov.uk (media) — “the government and housing advocacy groups like Generation Rent explicitly state that high numbers of short-term lets *are* preventing local people from finding affordable housing”
- Frontier Economics found no link between holiday let concentration and house price growth, attributing price changes to broader economic factors. — groupaccommodation.com (media) — “Frontier Economics (for PASC UK) found no link between holiday let concentration and house price growth or affordability issues, attributing price changes to broader economic factors”
- High short-term let rents incentivise owners, potentially reducing long-term rental stock and impacting affordability. — propertymark.co.uk (media) — “high short-term let rents incentivize owners, potentially reducing long-term rental stock and impacting affordability”
Biggest unknown: Whether holiday let concentration is a meaningful cause of local unaffordability, or whether broader factors like interest rates and new supply dominate — credible analysts disagree sharply on this.
Our reading: The policy works by enabling — not mandating — councils to restrict holiday let growth. The affordable housing effect therefore depends on two linked questions: (1) do holiday lets meaningfully reduce local housing supply and push up rents/prices? and (2) will councils actually use these powers? On question one, the evidence is genuinely split. Generation Rent's data shows 35,000 homes lost to short-term lets since 2019. Propertymark flags that high short-term let yields incentivise landlords away from long-term letting. On the other side, Frontier Economics finds holiday lets are 0.6% of stock with no demonstrable link to house price growth, pointing to interest rates and new supply as the real drivers. Both positions have some grounding in the evidence provided, so a mixed/uncertain verdict is honest. On question two, the policy only grants powers — councils in high-pressure areas (coastal, rural hotspots) may use them, others may not. Even where used, conversion of holiday lets back to long-term tenancies is not automatic; some owners may leave properties empty (as seen in Welsh second-homes data) rather than re-enter the long-term market. The magnitude is at most minor. Even if every council acted and holiday lets returned to long-term use, the stock effect is small relative to overall housing need — and broader affordability drivers (interest rates, housebuilding, income growth) dwarf this lever. The time horizon is this-parliament if councils act quickly, but the permissive nature of the power means delivery is uncertain. The abolition of the Furnished Holiday Lettings tax regime (already legislated separately) removes a financial incentive for owners, which may reinforce this policy's effect marginally — but that is a separate measure not part of this policy text.
Personal liberty & free speech — Hurts
minor · moderate confidence
This policy would give councils new powers to restrict how private property owners use their homes as holiday lets, which is a direct expansion of state control over property rights. The effect is real but modest in scale, affecting a small fraction of total housing stock.
The evidence
- The policy would give councils powers to manage (i.e. restrict) the growth of holiday lets. — conservatives.com (manifesto) — “ensure councils have the powers needed to manage the uncontrolled growth of holiday lets”
- Councils would be able to remove permitted development rights from holiday let owners as part of these powers. — propertymark.co.uk (media) — “Councils will also have powers to remove permitted development rights if necessary.”
- Holiday lets currently represent only 0.6% of total housing stock in England and Wales, meaning the population of property owners directly affected is small. — frontier-economics.com (media) — “holiday lets represent a small fraction of the total housing stock (0.6% of 26.9 million homes in England and Wales)”
- Homeowners can still let their main home for up to 90 nights per year without needing to register, suggesting a baseline exemption remains. — propertymark.co.uk (media) — “Homeowners can still let out their main home for up to 90 nights a year without needing to register.”
Biggest unknown: How broadly and aggressively councils would exercise the new powers — targeted light-touch licensing versus blanket bans would have very different liberty implications for property owners.
Our reading: O10 concerns freedom from state coercion over property rights. This policy explicitly grants councils new powers to restrict how private property owners may use their own homes — removing permitted development rights where councils deem it necessary. That is a straightforward expansion of state control over private property use, which scores as a worsening of O10. The liberty cost is real: owners who would otherwise be free to let their property as a holiday let would face a new permission regime or outright prohibition at council discretion. However, the magnitude is minor for two reasons. First, the affected population is small — holiday lets are 0.6% of total housing stock, so the coercive reach touches a narrow slice of property owners. Second, a residual personal-use exemption remains (90 nights without registration), limiting the intrusion for owner-occupiers. The policy does not criminalise speech, mandate surveillance, or impose bodily controls — the liberty harm is confined to property rights. Confidence is moderate: the stated mechanism (council powers, removal of permitted development rights) is clear, but the actual degree of restriction depends entirely on how councils exercise discretion, which is unknown.
Community cohesion & belonging — Helps
minor · low confidence
Giving councils powers to limit holiday-let growth could help rebuild the long-term resident base that sustains community ties, but the effect depends entirely on whether and how councils choose to use those powers. The evidence on whether holiday lets actually hollow out communities is genuinely contested.
The evidence
- The policy commits to giving councils powers to manage uncontrolled growth of holiday lets, citing nuisance to residents and 'hollowing out' of communities. — conservatives.com (manifesto) — “ensure councils have the powers needed to manage the uncontrolled growth of holiday lets, which can cause nuisance to local residents and 'hollowing out' of communities”
- Using residential areas for short-term lets can lead to increased anti-social behaviour, noise, and a loss of community feeling, especially where properties are let full-time. — propertymark.co.uk (media) — “Using residential areas for short-term accommodation can lead to issues like increased anti-social behaviour, noise, and a loss of community feeling, especially where properties are let full-time as holiday lets, resulti…”
- Councils will have powers to remove permitted development rights if necessary, providing a concrete enforcement mechanism. — propertymark.co.uk (media) — “Councils will also have powers to remove permitted development rights if necessary”
- The government's stated aim is to prevent hollowing out of communities and support local residents priced out by short-term lets. — gov.uk (media) — “The government states these changes are part of a long-term plan to prevent the "hollowing out" of communities and ensure local people can find affordable housing”
- Generation Rent (advocacy) estimates over 35,000 homes have become holiday homes or short-term lets since 2019, at roughly 29 long-term homes lost per day — though this is an advocacy source and should be weighted accordingly. — generationrent.org (media) — “over 35,000 homes have become holiday homes or short-term lets since 2019, leading to a loss of approximately 29 long-term homes a day”
- Frontier Economics (commissioned by industry) found holiday lets represent only 0.6% of housing stock and found no link between holiday let concentration and house price or affordability issues. — groupaccommodation.com (media) — “Frontier Economics (for PASC UK) found no link between holiday let concentration and house price growth or affordability issues, attributing price changes to broader economic factors”
- House of Commons Library notes complex, multi-faceted community impacts from holiday lets, including potential housing supply reduction but also economic boosts. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “noting the complex, multi-faceted impacts on local communities, including potential reduction in housing supply and increased house prices, but also economic boosts from tourism”
Biggest unknown: Whether councils will actively use the new powers, and whether reducing holiday-let concentration measurably restores social trust and belonging rather than merely shifting housing tenure.
Our reading: The O15 fundamental turns on whether people feel part of a settled, trusting community. The most direct mechanism here is the replacement of long-term residents with transient visitors: evidence (E25) confirms that full-time holiday lets can generate noise, anti-social behaviour, and erode community feeling by converting residential streets into effectively tourist accommodation. The policy addresses this by giving councils concrete powers — including removing permitted development rights (E3) — which goes beyond a purely aspirational commitment. However, three caveats limit the verdict to minor and low-confidence. First, the policy is enabling rather than mandating: whether O15 actually improves depends on whether councils deploy these powers, which the policy text does not guarantee. Second, the evidence on scale is genuinely contested: Frontier Economics (E31) finds no link between holiday-let concentration and community harm, while Generation Rent (E8, advocacy — flagged) and the government (E5) assert real hollowing-out effects. The House of Commons Library (E36) explicitly describes these impacts as complex and multi-faceted. Third, even if some communities recover their resident base, the O15 indicators (social trust surveys, civic participation, sense of belonging) typically shift slowly over years, making this a long-term effect at best. The counterfactual absent the policy is continued unmanaged growth in high-pressure areas, with councils lacking the tools to intervene even where hollowing-out is clearly occurring. The marginal gain from this policy — enabling intervention — is real but contingent. The direction leans toward 'improves' because the mechanism is concrete and the stated problem (loss of settled community) is directly O15-relevant, but the magnitude is minor given the conditionality and contested evidence.