Protect Right to Buy Discounts
Conservative · what the evidence says
An independent, source-checked look at Conservative’s policy “Protect Right to Buy Discounts” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.
Affordable housing — Hurts
moderate · moderate confidence
Protecting high Right to Buy discounts helps individual council tenants buy their homes, but the evidence strongly shows RTB has shrunk the social housing stock far faster than replacements can be built — meaning fewer affordable homes for everyone else. The main caveat is that some individual buyers, especially lower-income ones, do gain real wealth.
The evidence
- The policy commits to keeping RTB discounts rising with inflation and opposing any local authority attempts to abolish the scheme. — conservatives.com (manifesto) — “protect the laws ensuring Right to Buy discounts rise with inflation and fight any plans by local authorities to abolish Right to Buy”
- RTB has caused a net loss of around 260,000 social rent homes over the last decade. — england.shelter.org.uk (media) — “Shelter reports a net loss of 260,000 social rent homes in the last ten years, primarily due to RTB”
- In 2024-25, sales vastly outpaced replacements: 7,494 sales versus only 3,593 replacements funded. — gov.uk (media) — “In 2024-25, 7,494 eligible sales were reported, while only 3,593 replacements were funded, indicating a continuing shortfall”
- Social housing waiting lists stand at around 1.3 million households, with over 117,000 homeless households in temporary accommodation. — england.shelter.org.uk (media) — “social housing waiting lists, which currently stand at around 1.3 million households, and a rise in homelessness, with over 117,000 homeless households in temporary accommodation”
- Nearly one million more social homes have been sold than replaced since the scheme began. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “nearly one million more social homes have been sold than replaced since the scheme's introduction”
- Over 40% of homes bought under RTB have ended up in private landlord hands, converting affordable social rent into more expensive private rentals. — common-wealth.org (media) — “over 40% of homes purchased under the scheme have ended up in the hands of private landlords”
- This conversion of social homes to private rentals drives up housing benefit costs and reduces affordability for those who cannot buy. — en.wikipedia.org (media) — “transforms genuinely affordable social housing into less secure and often more expensive private rentals, potentially driving up housing benefit costs”
- The IFS found RTB did little for those at the very bottom of the wealth distribution and led to welfare costs as social stock dwindled. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “it did little for those at the very bottom of the wealth distribution and, as stock dwindled, led to welfare costs due to misallocating would-be social tenants into inappropriate private dwellings”
- Suspending RTB could save an estimated 10,100 council-owned social homes each year. — england.shelter.org.uk (media) — “suspending RTB could save 10,100 council-owned social homes each year”
- One-for-one replacement commitments for RTB sales have consistently not been met in practice. — england.shelter.org.uk (media) — “governments have often pledged one-for-one replacement of homes sold, analysts and local authorities consistently highlight the failure to achieve this in practice”
- Local authorities and their representative bodies have called for greater discretion to pause or manage RTB in high-pressure areas. — gov.uk (media) — “local authorities and their representative bodies advocate for greater discretion to manage the scheme, including the ability to pause or abolish RTB in areas of high housing pressure”
Biggest unknown: Whether any future replacement commitments would be funded and delivered at scale, which has historically not happened.
Our reading: The evidence presents a clear and heavily one-sided picture. Protecting and inflation-indexing RTB discounts sustains — and on current trends likely accelerates — the depletion of social housing stock. Sales in 2024-25 ran at more than twice the rate of funded replacements, and historically nearly one million more homes have been sold than replaced. Over 40% of purchased properties have shifted to private landlords, meaning the stock is not just leaving public ownership but actively converting into less affordable, less secure tenure — the opposite of what O1 requires. The social housing waiting list of 1.3 million and 117,000 households in temporary accommodation reflect a crisis of supply, and RTB is a measurable contributor to that crisis. The IFS, Resolution Foundation, and Shelter all point in the same direction: RTB has shrunk the affordable stock faster than it can be replenished, and the welfare costs of that shrinkage fall on the most vulnerable. The only genuine counterweight is that individual buyers — particularly lower-income working families in earlier decades — gained real wealth. But with home ownership rates falling since 2003 and most remaining stock already in housing associations (ineligible for RTB), the pool of beneficiaries has narrowed while the harm to those who cannot buy has grown. The policy also explicitly blocks local authorities from exercising discretion to pause RTB in high-pressure areas, removing the one lever councils have to stem stock loss where it is most acute. On balance, the evidence firmly supports a verdict that this policy worsens affordable housing access for the many, while providing a modest benefit for the few who can exercise the right to buy.
Public finances & the next generation — Hurts
moderate · moderate confidence
Protecting inflation-linked Right to Buy discounts continues a scheme that independent analysts say costs the public sector more in lost assets and rising housing-benefit bills than it returns in sale proceeds — passing the bill to future generations. The main caveat is that the scale of ongoing fiscal damage depends heavily on whether replacement commitments are met.
The evidence
- The policy commits to keeping Right to Buy discount levels rising with inflation and opposing any local authority move to abolish the scheme. — conservatives.com (manifesto) — “protect the laws ensuring Right to Buy discounts rise with inflation and fight any plans by local authorities to abolish Right to Buy”
- In 2024-25 only 3,593 replacements were funded against 7,494 sales, showing a continuing structural shortfall. — gov.uk (media) — “In 2024-25, 7,494 eligible sales were reported, while only 3,593 replacements were funded, indicating a continuing shortfall”
- Government commitments for one-for-one replacement of additional sales have not been fully met, particularly for later sales. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “government commitments for one-for-one replacement of "additional sales" (those resulting from enhanced discounts) have not been fully met, particularly for later sales, indicating a struggle to keep pace with sales”
- The IFS notes that as social housing stock dwindled under RTB, welfare costs rose because local authorities found it harder to accommodate families in need. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “they also pointed to welfare costs as the social housing stock dwindled, making it harder for local authorities to accommodate families in need”
- The Resolution Foundation finds that the depletion of social housing stock under RTB ultimately drove up the housing benefit bill. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “the depletion of social housing stock ultimately drove up the housing benefit bill”
- Over 40% of homes purchased under the scheme are estimated to have ended up in private landlord hands. — common-wealth.org (media) — “over 40% of homes purchased under the scheme have ended up in the hands of private landlords”
- This shift from social to private rental tenure potentially drives up housing benefit costs. — en.wikipedia.org (media) — “This transforms genuinely affordable social housing into less secure and often more expensive private rentals, potentially driving up housing benefit costs”
- Councils received only the equivalent of £104 billion from sales of homes now valued at £430 billion, indicating large permanent losses of public-sector balance-sheet value. — cprelondon.org.uk (media) — “Councils only received the equivalent of £104 billion (in today's money) from sales of homes now valued at £430 billion”
- The loss of housing assets reduces local authorities' capacity to meet housing needs and increases costs related to temporary accommodation and housing benefits. — england.shelter.org.uk (media) — “This loss of assets reduces their capacity to meet housing needs and increases costs related to temporary accommodation and housing benefits”
Biggest unknown: Whether any future government could achieve genuine one-for-one replacement of sold homes, which would materially reduce the long-run housing-benefit cost that drives most of the fiscal harm.
Our reading: The fiscal case against protecting inflation-linked RTB discounts rests on two linked mechanisms, both supported by institutional evidence. First, the scheme transfers public-sector assets at below-market prices: councils have received far less from sales than the current value of sold stock (E7), and a substantial share of sold homes has moved into private landlord hands (E10) rather than remaining owner-occupied, meaning the intended social gain does not offset the fiscal loss. This tenure shift compounds housing-benefit pressure over time (E11). Second, the structural replacement shortfall (E3, E25) means fewer social homes exist to house those in need, which the IFS (E18) and Resolution Foundation (E15) both link to rising welfare costs — the classic mechanism by which near-term capital receipts are outweighed by long-run revenue expenditure. Protecting inflation-linked discounts sustains and deepens this dynamic: higher discounts per sale increase the per-unit balance-sheet loss and worsen the replacement gap by reducing receipts available to fund new build. The near-term fiscal effect is ambiguous — councils still receive some capital — but the long-run debt-path effect is negative because ongoing replacement failures compound housing-benefit pressure. The magnitude is moderate rather than major because the annual volume of sales is not large enough to move aggregate debt ratios rapidly; the harm accumulates over decades. Confidence is moderate: the directional signal from IFS and Resolution Foundation is consistent, but the precise fiscal magnitude is uncertain and depends on replacement rates that could in principle improve.
Inequality & fair shares — Hurts
moderate · moderate confidence
Keeping Right to Buy discounts high lets some council tenants build wealth, but the evidence shows most gains flow to those who can already afford to buy or to private landlords, while the loss of cheap social homes hurts the poorest most. Over time this widens rather than narrows the gap between the richest and the rest.
The evidence
- The policy commits to protecting laws so RTB discounts rise with inflation and opposes local authority attempts to abolish RTB. — conservatives.com (manifesto) — “protect the laws ensuring Right to Buy discounts rise with inflation and fight any plans by local authorities to abolish Right to Buy”
- In early stages RTB broadly reduced household wealth inequality for working families who could exercise the right. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “in its early stages, RTB generally benefited economic agents and likely reduced household wealth inequality, particularly for working families on lower incomes who could exercise the right”
- However the IFS notes RTB did little for those at the very bottom of the wealth distribution and led to welfare costs as social stock dwindled. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “it did little for those at the very bottom of the wealth distribution and, as stock dwindled, led to welfare costs due to misallocating would-be social tenants into inappropriate private dwellings”
- Over 40% of homes purchased under the scheme have ended up with private landlords, not owner-occupiers. — common-wealth.org (media) — “over 40% of homes purchased under the scheme have ended up in the hands of private landlords”
- Converting social housing to private renting may drive up housing costs for lower-income renters and housing benefit costs. — en.wikipedia.org (media) — “This transforms genuinely affordable social housing into less secure and often more expensive private rentals, potentially driving up housing benefit costs”
- Sales have far outpaced replacements — only 3,593 replacements were funded against 7,494 eligible sales in 2024-25. — gov.uk (media) — “In 2024-25, 7,494 eligible sales were reported, while only 3,593 replacements were funded, indicating a continuing shortfall”
- Net loss of 260,000 social rent homes over the last ten years is primarily attributed to RTB. — england.shelter.org.uk (media) — “Shelter reports a net loss of 260,000 social rent homes in the last ten years, primarily due to RTB”
- The Resolution Foundation finds RTB boosted home ownership and democratised wealth for early buyers but ultimately drove up the housing benefit bill by depleting social stock. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “while it boosted home ownership and democratized wealth for early buyers, the depletion of social housing stock ultimately drove up the housing benefit bill”
- Governments have consistently failed to deliver one-for-one replacement of homes sold under RTB. — england.shelter.org.uk (media) — “analysts and local authorities consistently highlight the failure to achieve this in practice”
Biggest unknown: Whether replacement commitments could ever close the stock gap — if one-for-one replacement were actually delivered, the inequality effect would be much smaller.
Our reading: Right to Buy has two competing distributional effects. For buyers who can exercise the right, it transfers subsidised wealth — the IFS confirms this reduced inequality for working families in the scheme's early phase. But the evidence now points the other way overall. First, more than 40% of purchased homes have flowed to private landlords rather than new owner-occupiers, concentrating property wealth upward rather than spreading it. Second, each sale at an inflated discount removes a unit of genuinely affordable housing from the social stock; with sales running at roughly double the replacement rate, the cumulative loss is large. The households at the very bottom of the distribution — those who cannot afford to buy even at discount — are left competing for a shrinking social stock and face higher private rents, with the IFS explicitly stating RTB 'did little for those at the very bottom' and created welfare costs as stock dwindled. The Resolution Foundation concurs: early buyers gained, but the aggregate effect on the poorest is negative. Maintaining inflation-linked discounts and blocking local authority discretion to manage the scheme perpetuates and deepens this dynamic. The key counterfactual is whether genuine one-for-one replacement could neutralise the distributional harm; every available source confirms replacement has not been delivered in practice. Therefore, on the evidence, maintaining maximum RTB discounts modestly improves the position of the subset of council tenants who can buy, while materially worsening the position of the larger and poorer group who cannot, widening the gap overall.