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Build Two Carbon Capture and Storage Clusters

Conservative · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Conservative’s policy “Build Two Carbon Capture and Storage Clusters” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Public finances & the next generation — Mixed picture

moderate · moderate confidence

Building these clusters costs the public purse up to £21.7 billion over 25 years, but the investment finances decarbonisation infrastructure that independent analysis says would cost 30–250% more if delayed — so the near-term fiscal hit is real, while the long-run case depends on whether the projects deliver as planned.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the projects are delivered on time and at projected cost, given historical CCUS cancellations and the government's own admission that its 2030 capture targets are no longer achievable.

Our reading: For O12, the central question is whether this large public commitment finances productive investment that improves long-run fiscal sustainability, or whether it is an unfunded liability that worsens the debt path. The near-term fiscal cost is substantial and concrete: £9.4 billion in the current Parliament and up to £21.7 billion over 25 years, with £8–10 billion required for the first two clusters alone. Part of this is routed via consumer levies rather than direct spending, but this is still a claim on household and business resources with fiscal risk sitting with government if projects underperform. Against that, the productive-investment case is well-evidenced: Imperial College research finds that failing to deploy CCUS raises the cost of reaching net zero by 30–250%, meaning delay compounds the long-run fiscal burden through higher future abatement costs, missed carbon budgets, and potential non-compliance penalties. The Climate Change Committee classifies CCS as 'essential, not an option' for the UK's net-zero path. So the spending is plausibly self-justifying over a long horizon — the alternative is more expensive. However, delivery risk is significant. The government has already conceded that its headline 2030 capture target is 'no longer achievable'. Previous comparable programmes were cancelled at similar stages due to cost and commercial viability. If these clusters are delayed or cancelled again, the near-term fiscal cost becomes stranded expenditure financing nothing, which unambiguously worsens O12. The verdict is therefore 'mixed': there is a genuine near-term fiscal cost alongside a credible long-run productive-investment rationale, but delivery uncertainty prevents a clean 'improves' verdict. Magnitude is moderate given the scale of the commitment relative to GDP, felt over the long term.

Prosperity & living standards — Helps

moderate · moderate confidence

Building these two CCS clusters is projected to create tens of thousands of industrial jobs in deprived regions and protect hard-to-abate industries that underpin regional economies, but the economic benefits are mostly long-term and depend on projects being delivered on time and at manageable cost to consumers.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the clusters are delivered on schedule and within budget, given the history of cancelled CCS projects and current government admission that its 2030 capture targets are no longer achievable.

Our reading: The two CCS clusters represent a committed, funded industrial infrastructure programme — contracts are signed for both clusters (E1, E2), not merely aspirational. On O13's indicators of productivity, business investment, and economic opportunity, the case for a moderate long-term improvement is supported by three channels. First, direct job creation: projections of up to 25,000 jobs from the East Coast Cluster alone and 50,000 across the sector (E8, E11), concentrated in regions with historically weaker labour markets (Teesside, North West), represent genuine gains for economic opportunity and mobility. Second, industrial preservation: protecting up to 70% of Teesside's heavy industry jobs (E9) and enabling decarbonisation of cement, steel, and chemicals (E14) — sectors that would otherwise face existential regulatory pressure — sustains productive capacity that underpins regional living standards. Third, the counterfactual cost: Imperial College modelling suggests inaction raises decarbonisation costs by 30–250% (E23), meaning that without this infrastructure, industry faces either higher costs or closure, both damaging to O13. Against this, the consumer-levy funding model raises costs to households and businesses in the near term (E37), and the gas-lock-in risk (E29) could erode long-term energy-independence gains. Historical cancellations (E26) and slippage on ambitions (E32) underscore delivery risk. The balance of evidence supports a moderate long-term improvement: the mechanism is funded, contracted, and independently assessed as necessary for preserving industrial competitiveness, but the gains are realised over decades and hinge on delivery following through.

Inequality & fair shares — Mixed picture

minor · low confidence

The policy could narrow regional inequality by creating tens of thousands of industrial jobs in historically deprived areas like Teesside and the North West, but its consumer levy funding model raises questions about energy bill impacts that could affect lower-income households. Both effects are uncertain in scale.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether any energy bill impacts from consumer levy funding fall disproportionately on lower-income households, and by how much, is unquantified in the evidence and would determine the net distributional direction.

Our reading: O14 asks whether the gap between richest and rest narrows or widens. Two distributional effects pull in opposite directions. On the narrowing side: the policy concentrates large-scale industrial job creation in Teesside, the Humber, and the North West — regions where heavy industry employment has historically been economically significant. Protecting 70% of heavy-industry jobs in Teesside and supporting up to 50,000 sector-wide jobs would, if delivered, reduce regional income inequality, one of O14's key indicators. On the widening side: the funding model relies partly on consumer levies, which — as flagged in the evidence — raises questions about potential impacts on energy bills. If levy costs fall as a larger share of income on lower-income households, this would partially offset employment gains for working people in poorer regions. However, the evidence only flags this as an unresolved concern; no distributional quantification is available in the provided evidence, so the direction and size of this effect cannot be confirmed. Both effects are real and cited, hence 'mixed'. Magnitude is minor because neither effect is large at the aggregate national inequality level — the jobs are spread over decades and the levy concern is qualitative only. Confidence is low because no distributional modelling of this specific policy appears in the provided evidence.

Good work & fair pay — Helps

moderate · moderate confidence

Building these carbon capture clusters is projected to create tens of thousands of jobs in industrial heartlands like Teesside and the North West, protecting existing heavy-industry employment while enabling new roles. The main caveat is that these are long-run projections with a patchy delivery track record, and start-up is not expected before 2028.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the clusters are actually delivered on time and at scale, given that previous UK CCS programmes were cancelled and the government has already admitted its 2030 carbon targets are no longer achievable.

Our reading: The policy directly targets regions — Teesside, the Humber, North West England, North Wales — with heavy concentrations of industrial employment in sectors like steel, chemicals, and cement. The evidence shows that both clusters have now reached contract stage (E1, E2), so these are not purely aspirational: there is a committed delivery pathway, albeit with a 2028 start-up date meaning effects on employment are long-term rather than immediate. The job projections are substantial: the East Coast Cluster alone could create or sustain ~25,000 industrial jobs over the project lifetime, protect up to 70% of Teesside's heavy-industry workforce, and the wider CCUS programme could support 50,000 jobs in total. These are government and operator projections, so they carry inherent optimism, but they are directionally consistent across multiple cited sources. Crucially, the policy is not just about new jobs — it is about preserving existing ones. CCUS is identified as essential for sectors with few alternative decarbonisation routes (E14). Without it, hard-to-abate industries face closure or offshoring, destroying existing secure, often well-paid industrial jobs. The policy therefore addresses job security (an O4 indicator) as much as job creation. The main risk to the verdict is delivery. UK CCS has failed twice before (E26), and the Public Accounts Committee has noted reduced ambitions and delays (E36). The 2030 carbon target has already been acknowledged as unachievable (E21). If projects slip or are again cancelled, the employment benefits do not materialise. This tempers confidence to moderate and limits the verdict to 'improves' rather than a higher-magnitude 'major', since the benefits are real but contingent and distant.

Clean environment & nature — Helps

moderate · moderate confidence

Building two carbon capture and storage clusters would meaningfully cut industrial CO2 emissions from hard-to-abate sectors, helping the UK towards net zero — but delivery delays, cost overruns, and the risk of locking in gas dependence mean the real-world benefit is uncertain and will take years to materialise.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the clusters are actually delivered on schedule and at the promised scale, given the government's own admission that 20-30 MtCO2/yr by 2030 is no longer achievable and the historical track record of cancelled CCS projects.

Our reading: The policy commits to delivering the two clusters that have now had contracts signed (East Coast and HyNet), with start-up targeted for 2028. Independent expert bodies — the CCC and Imperial College — agree that CCS is not optional for UK net zero, particularly for hard-to-abate industrial sectors where no viable alternative decarbonisation route exists. This gives the mechanism strong analytical grounding. Near-term captured volumes will be modest: initial phases deliver around 4–4.5 MtCO2/yr each, well below the original 20-30 MtCO2/yr target, which the government itself has abandoned. The long-term trajectory is more significant: if clusters scale as projected, total capacity could reach tens of MtCO2/yr by the mid-2030s, consistent with CCC requirements. The direction is therefore 'improves', but with three genuine caveats that constrain confidence to moderate. First, historical delivery failure is real — two prior CCS programmes were cancelled. Second, the CCC and LSE/Grantham flag that over-building capacity for gas-fired power and blue hydrogen risks prolonging gas dependence, potentially undermining the very emissions goals the clusters are meant to serve. Third, current scale remains insufficient relative to CCC's CB6 targets. On balance, proceeding with these clusters provides a meaningful and evidence-backed emissions reduction pathway that independent bodies regard as necessary infrastructure; delay would make net zero materially more costly. The effect is long-term (material benefit from 2028 onwards, scaling through the 2030s) and moderate in magnitude — real and necessary, but smaller than originally claimed and subject to delivery risk.

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